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This dissertation focuses on explaining the cyclicality of unemployment, job vacancies, job 
creation and market tightness in the US economy. The framework used to model unemployment 
and job creation throughout this work, is the search and matching model, created by Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1994). This dissertation proposes three different mechanisms to improve the 
performance of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model (DSGE) with search 
unemployment, to align the model’s predictions with the quarterly US data from 1955-2005. 
The first chapter proposes a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the 
labor market that can account for the cyclicality and persistence of vacancies, unemployment, 
job creation, inflation and the real wage, after a monetary shock. Motivated by evidence from 
psychology, unemployment is modeled as a social norm. The norm is the belief that individuals 
should exert effort to earn their living and free riders are a burden to society. Households 
pressure the unemployed to find jobs: the less unemployed workers there are, the more 
supporters the norm has and therefore the greater the pressure and psychological cost 
experienced by each unemployed searcher. By altering the value of being unemployed, this 
procyclical psychological cost hinders the wage from crowding out vacancy creation after a 
monetary shock. Thus, the model is able to capture the high volatility of vacancies and 
unemployment observed in the data, accounting for the Shimer puzzle. The paper also departs 
from the literature by introducing price rigidity in the labor market, inducing additional inertia 
and persistence in the response of inflation and the real wage after a monetary shock. The 
model's responses after a monetary shock are in line with the responses obtained from a VAR on 
US data. 
In the second chapter I attempt to solve the amplification puzzle, the inability of the standard 
search and matching model to account for the volatility in vacancies and unemployment, by 
exploring the connection between R&D and employment. R&D affects product creation and 
product creation affects employment. An improvement in technology benefits the economy in 
two ways. Same products can be produced more efficiently and also new products are created. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the increase in production for already existing goods does not 
imply increases in employment, while new products are associated with increases in employment. 
The search and matching model implies that changes in technology do not imply large changes 
in employment for already existing goods which is in line with what the evidence suggest. 
However, when the search and matching model applies for sectors that innovate and produce 
new products, changes in employment significantly increase. Therefore, in this model I assume 
all agents need to innovate first before they create a job opening, because firms that invent new 
products are the ones that contribute more to the volatility of employment according to the 
evidence. Since ideas are cheaper to implement after a technological expansion, the cost of 
vacancies becomes countercyclical which boosts job creation and vacancies. The model can 
amplify the volatilities of vacancies, unemployment and market tightness approximately by up to 
300 percent. 
The third chapter investigates the macroeconomic implications from introducing perpetual 
learning in a simple search and matching model. When the agents with rational expectations are 
replaced with agents that are boundedly rational, the volatilities of vacancies, unemployment and 
market tightness are increased significantly. Job creation is connected to the present discounted 
value of future cash flows, which means that if agents do not form rational expectations, their 
forecasts of future cash flows are subject to periods of either excess optimism or excess 
pessimism. Those extra distortions of the agents' forecasts amplify the volatility of job creation. 
Therefore, the amplification puzzle arising from the search and matching model might be due to 
the strong assumption that agents are rational; thus, when agents need to form multi-period 
forecasts using past data as in Preston (2005) and Eusepi and Preston (2010), the search and 
matching model's amplification potential is enhanced. The model can replicate moments from 
quarterly US data from 1955Q1 to 2007Q4. However the more amplification added to the model 
through higher gain parameter, the further the correlations generated by the model are from the 
ones obtained from US data. That is because higher amplification induces vacancies to fluctuate 
around the rational expectations equilibrium less smoothly. Moreover, higher amplification 
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This paper proposes a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the
labor market that can account for the cyclicality and persistence of vacancies, unemployment,
job creation, ination and the real wage, after a monetary shock. Motivated by evidence
from psychology, unemployment is modeled as a social norm. The norm is the belief that
individuals should exert e¤ort to earn their living and free riders are a burden to society.
Households pressure the unemployed to nd jobs: the less unemployed workers there are,
the more supporters the norm has and therefore the greater the pressure and psychological
cost experienced by each unemployed searcher. By altering the value of being unemployed,
this procyclical psychological cost hinders the wage from crowding out vacancy creation after
a monetary shock. Thus, the model is able to capture the high volatility of vacancies and
unemployment observed in the data, accounting for the Shimer puzzle. The paper also departs
from the literature by introducing price rigidity in the labor market, inducing additional inertia
and persistence in the response of ination and the real wage after a monetary shock. The




The search and matching model introduced by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), (MP model), has
been a workhorse for economists in the last couple of decades. Although the MP model outperforms
the standard RBC model with no labor market frictions (Merz (1994), Andolfatto (1996)), it fails
in explaining the strong cyclicality and persistence of key labor market variables such as vacancies,
unemployment and job creation (Shimer (2005a), Fujita (2003)). Moreover, it fails to account for
the inertial and persistent response of ination after a monetary shock, (Trigari (2006), Krause and
Lubik (2006) and Christo¤el and Linzert (2005)).
The amplication puzzle, the di¢ culty of the standard MP model to match the volatility of
unemployment and vacancies according to Shimer (2005a), lies in the particular wage formation
method imposed by the standard search and matching framework, which makes the wage depend
on workersoutside options. During an expansion, vacancy posting increases, boosting hiring and
forcing unemployment duration to decrease. Lower unemployment duration increases the value in
the unemployment state for a worker, strengthening their bargaining power which entitles them a
higher wage contract. Thus, the wage becomes so responsive to workersoutside opportunities that
ends up absorbing most of the e¤ect of the shock, leaving prots barely a¤ected and the incentive
to post vacancies too low. The amplication puzzle exists not only for productivity shocks, but
also for monetary and other exogenous forces as well.
In addition, Shimer (2005a) argues that the standard MP model fails to create enough propa-
gation of the shocks, forcing the responses to die out immediately after the shocks. The contempo-
raneous correlations between the market tightness and the productivity shock is equal to -1 instead
of -0.4 as the data suggest. The propagation problem (as well as the amplication problem) for
the case of monetary shocks, is shown by Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2009), where the
authors nd that enough propagation can be created by the search and matching framework only
by assuming high degrees of price rigidity for individual nal-good rms.
This paper presents a New Keynesian model with nominal rigidities and search and matching
frictions. My new modications are the following:
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1. Unemployment as a social norm. Households support the norm that everyone should
put e¤ort to earn their living and free riders are frowned upon. Thus, theres pressure on
unemployed workers to nd jobs. The fewer the unemployed in a group of people, the more
supporters the norm has and the greater the loss or reputation or psychological cost su¤ered
by each unemployed person within the group. There are two unemployment rates a¤ecting
workersbargaining power, each having an opposite e¤ect on the underlying wage. The rst
is the economy-wide unemployment rate and the second is the unemployment rate of relevant
others (closest people in someones immediate environment). In an expansion, the economy-
wide unemployment rate decreases, decreasing unemployment duration and strengthening
workersbargaining power as argued by Shimer (2005a). Moreover, during an expansion, the
decreasing unemployment rate of relevant others implies, according to the norm, a greater
loss of reputation for the unemployed within a group, weakening the workers bargaining
power. The two opposite e¤ects counterbalance each other preventing the wage from being too
responsive to outside opportunities and hindering it from absorbing most of the e¤ect of the
shock. The importance of social norms in restoring the missing motivation in macroeconomic
models is stressed in Akerlof (2006).
2. Price rigidity in the labor market. I assume every worker is a rm, producing an interme-
diate di¤erentiated good, facing monopolistic competition and price rigidity. Price rigidity in
the intermediate goodssector not only adds ination inertia ala Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005) but also adds persistence in the model without the need to impose high degrees
of price rigidity. Moreover, price rigidity in the labor market smooths out the response of the
real wage after a monetary shock while also signicantly reduces the real wages volatility,
which tends to be excessively volatile when monetary shocks are introduced in a standard MP
framework. It is important to note that this model assumes price rigidity, while assuming no
rigidities in the wage bargained by rms and workers.
I identify a structural VAR on U.S. data and compare the impulse responses implied by my
model with the ones obtained by the VAR. My primary goal is to explain the persistent and
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volatile responses of the labor market variables and at the same time explain the smooth and low
responses of ination and hourly wages after a monetary shock. The contribution of this paper is
twofold. On one hand, it aims to enhance the performance of the standard MP model in order
to be in-line with evidence on vacancies, unemployment and job creation. On the other hand it
contributes to the literature of augmenting the standard New Keynesian model with search and
matching frictions, in order to explain among others, ination and wage behavior after a monetary
shock. I propose new mechanisms to bring the model closer to the data, while borrowing others
from the literature.
There are a few attempts to modify a New Keynesian model with the search and matching
framework in order to explain the above. The rst attempt was made by Trigari (2004). Even
though the model has no predictions for the responses of the wage, unemployment and vacancies,
it shows how the inclusion of search frictions improves the performance of the basic New Keynesian
model, to account for ination and output responses to a monetary shock. After Trigari (2004),
more New Keynesian models with search frictions appeared, such as Braun (2005) and Kuester
(2007). The main element that amplies the responses of vacancies and unemployment in both
models is wage rigidity. However, the empirical validity of wage rigidity for new rms has been
rejected recently by Pissarides (2007) and Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens (2008). In addition,
both models assume a value for unemployment benets following the calibration of Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2007) who claim that high unemployment benets can amplify shocks. The critique on
this approach is that those models lead to the counterfactual prediction that unemployment benet
policy is extremely e¤ective as argued by Costain and Reiter (2007).
Section 2 presents the facts, the empirical responses from a structural VAR on U.S. data and
the empirical evidence supporting the existence of unemployment as a social norm. In the same
section, I present the theoretical framework to incorporate the unemployment as a social norm in
the job searching environment. In section 3, I present the model in detail, analyzing the behavior
of each of the agents. Section 4 presents the calibration along with the estimation1 procedure and
1 I calibrate some parameters to commonly used values from independent studies, while I estimate the rest to




2 The puzzles and the social norm mechanism
Figure 1 shows the responses to a unit monetary shock estimated by a structural VAR. The U.S.
data2 are from 1955:1 to 2005:1 and the identication assumption is that the only variable contem-
poraneously correlated with the monetary shock is the nominal interest rate, while the remaining
variables respond with a lag.
The variables3 are: the log of quarterly real GDP, the annualized quarterly rate of change in the
CPI, the log of Help-Wanted advertising, the civilian unemployment rate, the log of job creation
for continuing establishments in the manufacturing sector, the log of average hourly earnings in the
business sector, the log of total hours in the business sector and the e¤ective federal funds rate4 .
The solid lines in gure 1 are the empirical impulse responses from the SVAR and the grey regions
the associated 90% condence intervals.
The propagation puzzle is evident from gure 1. All the variables are very persistent, especially
output, ination, vacancies, unemployment and the real wage, as the responses die out between the
fteenth and the twentieth quarter while achieving the maximum e¤ect around the tenth quarter.
Especially, ination persists even after the twentieth quarter. Therefore, a need for a model that
can provide enough propagation is necessary to explain the above facts.
Moreover, the amplication challenge is evident by examining the magnitude of the responses
of vacancies, unemployment and job creation. The response of vacancies is close to eight times
larger than the response of output, while the response of unemployment is around eight times the
response of output. Even though job creation is not persistent, it is very volatile with magnitude
around ve times that of output. Thus, a model equipped with a strong amplication mechanism
is eminent.
The real wage responses are very low, nearly half the response of the real GDP and quite inertial.
2 I consider the data set up to 2005:1 because of the availability of data for job creation up to that date.
3All data series come from the St. Louis economic database except for the job creation series.
4The job creation variable is coming from the job creation and destruction database by Davis, Haltiwanger and
Shuh (1996)
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to 1% monetary shock for U.S. data 1955:1 to 2005:1. Shaded areas are 90%
condence intervals.
It is particularly challenging for a model that combines the search and matching specication along
with monetary shocks, to explain the low response of the real wage, as shown by Christiano,
Trabandt and Walentin (2009), as the model tends to overshoot the response of wages after a
monetary shock.
2.1 The amplication puzzle
The puzzle arises from the particular bargaining problem which generates a specic wage equation.
Wages not only include match-specic characteristics but also reect outside opportunities. The
outside opportunity for workers is the value of unemployment. Because in any stage of the bargain,
the worker threatens to quit and look elsewhere for a job, the value of unemployment (the outside
option) becomes a part of the wage equation.
The standard MP model assumes than in an expansion, vacancy creation increases and un-
employment decreases. This will decrease the unemployed workersunemployment duration and
consequently the value of unemployment. Thus, when the workers bargain and threaten to quit and
6
look for a job elsewhere, their threat becomes more credible when the outside conditions are bene-
cial for the unemployed. This increases the bargaining power of the workers too much and enables
them to negotiate a higher wage contract. The higher wage decreases rm prots and decreases the
incentive to post vacancies. In other words, in an expansion, the increase in vacancies triggers a
signicant improvement in workersoutside options (value in unemployment state), which through
a wage increase reduces the initial increase in job vacancies.
2.2 Social norms and the norm of unemployment
The way I solve the amplication puzzle is through the introduction of unemployment as a social
norm. Norms are rules of behavior members of a social group are expected to follow and distinguish
appropriate from inappropriate behavior. Failure to follow the rule or code might result in loss of
reputation within the group, isolation, guilt, psychological pressure or even discharge from the
group. The consequences from disobeying the code depend on how strong is the support of the
norm within the group members. The stronger the support of a norm, or a sudden increase in the
supporters of the norm, exacerbates the loss of reputation or the psychological cost of those who
deviate from the code. Akerlof (1980) investigates the importance of norms in economic models and
Akerlof (2006) emphasizes that macro models have important missing motivation in the preferences
assumed simply by overlooking the existence of norms.
There are many examples of norms that dene the behavior of a group of individuals interacting
with each other. A norm can be a simple handshake, gift exchanging on birthdays or respecting and
supporting the elder and the disabled within a group. Even the idea of external habit formation
(catching up with the jonesses), can be thought as an embodiment of a social norm in macroeconomic
models. The norm in the case of habit would be the belief that an individuals consumption
capabilities are evident for the individuals success within the group. Failure to match or surpass
the others consumption will result in loss of reputation within the group. The greater is the
consumption of the rest in the group from ones own, the greater the loss of reputation experienced
by that individual.
In this paper, the social norm is that every individual should be a productive and useful member
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of the society by earning their living with their own e¤ort, or in other words, the unemployed are
free riders and free riders are nothing more than a burden to society. According to the norm, the
unemployed are clearly the code breakers, consuming part of the economys goods and services
without contributing at all in the production process. Since the unemployed break the rule, they
su¤er disutility from loss of reputation within the group. The loss of reputation can be accompanied
by feelings of uselessness, isolation, depression and constant feeling of being pressured by others
(friends, family, society) to nd a job.
The larger the unemployment within the group is, the fewer the supporters of the norm, there-
fore, the less severe is the loss of reputation or psychological cost su¤ered by each unemployed
individual. In other words, the more unemployed workers there are in ones immediate environ-
ment, the less the feeling of embarrassment, uselessness or inadequacy encountered by the particular
unemployed individual. Moreover, since households put pressure on the unemployed to nd jobs,
the more unemployed there are, the less is the pressure experienced by the individual unemployed
person. The blame feels always less intense if it can be shared among others.
There is empirical evidence supporting unemployment as a social norm. Clark (2003) uses as a
proxy for utility the General Health questionnaire5 (GHQ) which is a measure of mental well-being
(see Goldberg, 1972), and Clarks goal among others, is to examine the e¤ect of relevant others
unemployment, on ones own unemployment experience. The unemployment of relevant others is
dened in three alternative ways: the regional unemployment rate; the unemployment status of the
partner of the individual; the unemployment status of all other adults within the same household.
Irrespective of which one of the three denitions is used to represent relevant others, the author
reports that increases in the unemployment rate of relevant others increases the psychological well-
being of the individual unemployed worker.
Figure 2, coming from Clark (2003), presents some preliminary evidence of the positive impact
of othersunemployment on the well-being of the unemployed, where the measure of othersunem-
ployment is the regional unemployment rate. In the gure, the psychological cost of unemployment
is the di¤erence between GHQ values between employed and unemployed and is larger the larger the
5The GHQ is an indicator of psychological health state and is used extensively in medical, psychological and
socioeconomic research.
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Figure 2: From Clark (2003), a graph of the negative correlation between unemployment psychological
cost (CHQ, General Health Questionnaire) and the unemployment rate for various British regions. The
regression line has a slope of -0.127.
GHQ di¤erence between employed and unemployed is. The gure plots average psychological cost
of unemployment against the unemployment rate in di¤erent geographical regions in Britain. It is
prominent from the gure that when an unemployed person moves to a region with a higher unem-
ployment rate, experiences an improvement in psychological well-being. The results are unchanged
when the regression includes other individual characteristics.
The e¤ect of relevant others on ones own unemployment becomes more exaggerated when the
author alternatively denes othersunemployment as the unemployment rate of other household
members instead of regional unemployment, since the former denition captures the idea of a
persons immediate environment more accurately. Therefore one of the key ndings of Clarks paper
is: the psychological cost of individual unemployment is signicantly lower when more members of
the household become unemployed which veries my intuition that the loss of reputation or blame
hurts less if can be shared among others.
In a similar exercise, Clark (2009) reports the same evidence for OECD data and Clark, Knabe
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and Ratzel (2009) conrm the result in the case of German regions. Powdthavee (2007) also comes to
the same conclusion in an experiment with South African regions. Unemployment as a social norm is
also supported by Stutzer and Lalive (2004), where the intensity of the social norm is constructed by
votes in favour of lowering unemployment benets from a referendum in Switzerland in 1997. In the
regions where votes against unemployment benets have been the most, the unemployed reported
signicantly lower psychological well-being. Also similar results supporting unemployment as a
social norm are reported by Shields and Price (2005) for United Kingdom and Shields, Price and
Wooden (2008).
Those results are also in-line with other studies in unemployment psychology that take a di¤erent
route in dening well-being, other than GHQ. For example Jackson and Warr, (1987) report better
mental health for the unemployed in higher unemployment rate regions. Similar claims are made by
other authors using suicide and para-suicide rates who report that suicide and para-suicide attempts
occur the most in low unemployment regions e.g. Platt, Micciolo and Tansella (1992), Platt and
Kreitman (1990), or Neeleman (1998).
2.3 Dening unemployment as a social norm
I follow Akerlof (1980) and specically his social norm formulation, to incorporate in my model
the e¤ect of the unemployment of relevant others on the individual unemployed, as the empirical
evidence suggest. Akerlof denes a social norm by augmenting a usual utility function with the
reputation function:
R = R(A;) (1)
where A is a dummy variable that determines an agents obedience or disobedience to the com-
munitys rules of behavior and  is the portion of the groups population that support the rule.
Akerlofs social norm specication suggests that an individual who disobeys the rule, has to su¤er
disutility from loosing reputation in the group, whilst the more group members there are disobeying
the rule (low ), the less is the loss of reputation su¤ered by each individual that goes against the
rule.
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where Uht is the unemployment rate of relevant others, the unemployment rate in an individuals
immediate environment, which comprises friends, other household members, family, etc. The para-
meter  controls the relative importance of the social norm in the utility of the individual, relative
to the utility from consumption and leisure. In addition, the parameter `u governs the curvature
of this disutility function. The parameter u, determines the extent the reputation e¤ect depends
on the supporters of the norm. The greater u is, the greater the impact of the unemployment
of relevant otherson the psychological well-being of the respective unemployed person. I call the
parameter u: the Relevant OthersPsychological E¤ect (ROPE).
Every unemployed worker in my model su¤ers disutility from loss of reputation within their
own household according to equation (2). The larger the unemployment of relevant others Uht
within the group, the less is the loss of reputation experienced by the individual unemployed. The
unemployment rate Uht corresponds to  in Akerlofs social norm specication, equation (1). This
specication captures the relation between unemployment psychological cost and the unemployment
of relevant othersobserved in the empirical evidence.
The specic functional form for the social norm in equation (2), I derive with a simple model
for the job market, where the above function arises in the utility function as disutility from job
searching. There is no evidence as to what functional form an unemployment norm should have,
thus I derive the functional form (2), from other widely used functional forms in macroeconomic
models. Those functional forms arise naturally from the way the rest of the model is specied.
I simply assume, the same functional forms that determine the employeds production function
and disutility from work, are also the same functional forms that determine the unemployeds
"searching" production function and disutility from search. The next section derives my reputation
function more formally, giving a meaning to the parameters that appear in equation (2).
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2.4 A job market framework and unemployment as a social norm
As in the standard MP model, potential employers are posting vacancies every period. Each unem-
ployed worker provides  application units to employers, to claim a position in the job openings6 .
The xed application units per unemployed worker is in line with Shimer (2005a) ndings that
search intensity is acyclical, according to the Current Population Survey data. The matching func-






where Ft is the total application units provided every period by households.
In total, the application units demanded by a given household is:
FDht = Uht (3)
where Uht = 1 Nht is the unemployment rate within the hth household.
Workers can produce the FDht = Uht units of aggregate application units within the household,
by putting e¤ort according to the following production function FSht = L
u
ht. The aggregate e¤ort
7















where luhjt is the e¤ort provided by the j
th unemployed worker that induces Gu (lut ) units of disutility
per unemployed worker that gives rise to the reputation function (2). This disutility su¤ered by the
unemployed is going to be an important part of the match surplus and also of the wage equation
6 I assume the application units are xed, but in principle, the more application units transferred by a worker
relative to the rest, the more likely it is become employed relative to the others, thus the application units could be
a choice variable for the household.
7 I implicitly assume there is a rm selling "aggregation" services, which takes the individual unemployeds search
e¤ort units as inputs and produces the aggregate application units via equation (4), which then sells back to the
household. For simplicity I leave the full denition of such framework in the appendix A.
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The parameter u enters equation (4) as a parameter governing the complementarity in the





The numerator is the aggregate search e¤ort from having Uht individuals put q units of e¤ort each.
The denominator is the aggregate search e¤ort produced, by having only a single worker putting
qUht units of e¤ort. The elasticity of M with respect to Uht determines how much more e¢ cient it
is for the household to produce the aggregate e¤ort units from many di¤erent unemployed workers,
than producing all the aggregate e¤ort units from a single individual.
Since every worker puts the same amount of e¤ort, in equilibrium luhjt = l
u









In equilibrium the aggregate application units supplied, equal the ones demanded FDht = F
S
ht = F ,











units of disutility. The above framework for the job market will
impose a utility "penalty" (reputation e¤ect) for unemployed workers in the household that takes
the same form as equation (2). The parameter  corresponds to the application units to participate
in the job market and the complementarity parameter u measures the degree of ROPE (Relative
OthersPsychological E¤ect). The e¤ort demanded by each unemployed worker to participate in
the job market is inversely related to the size of the unemployment pool. This is exactly what
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the empirical evidence about social norms suggested. Higher unemployment rate of relevant others
implies higher psychological well-being for the individual unemployed which is captured here by
lower perceived search e¤ort. The relevant others in the model are the other household members.
The unemployeds psychological well-being is a¤ected by increases in the households unemploy-
ment rate, since higher unemployment within the household makes the reputation loss from being
unemployed more severe as there are less supporters of the norm.
Note here the special case where u = 0. The unemployed searcher has to simply put a xed e¤ort
 as part of her job market experience. Therefore, the e¤ect of the unemployment of relevant others
does not exist in this case. Under such assumption the model will behave similar to the standard
MP model. The interesting case is when u is positive. Since relative othersunemployment matters
for ones psychological well-being, according to (6), the larger the unemployment rate within the
household is, the less perceived e¤ort is needed by the individual job seeker in order to provide this
 application units to the employers.
2.5 Unemployment as a social norm and the amplication puzzle
Recall that the amplication puzzle arises because the wage responds too much after a shock, ab-
sorbing most of the e¤ect of the shock, eating away prots and leaving vacancy postings barely
volatile. What the social norm does, is to add an extra psychological cost term in workersun-
employment state, which during an expansion increases the perceived e¤ort to participate in the
job market, reducing the value of outside opportunities for workers, thus hindering the wage from
absorbing most of the e¤ect of the shock, which results into a signicant boost in vacancy creation.
Another way to interpret my mechanism in action is the following. The amplication puzzle
arises because in expansions unemployment duration decreases dramatically and gives employed
workers the right to bargain a high wage, which eventually crowds out employersprots and pre-
vents them from posting a lot of vacancies. Thus, the vacancy creation and the congestion exter-
nality of the falling economy-wide unemployment rate, increase the probability of the unemployed
to nd a job so much, that the state of unemployment becomes much less severe, giving bargaining
power in the hands of workers to negotiate a high wage. On the contrary, falling unemployment
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rate among relevant others induces greater psychological cost for the individual unemployed through
increasing the support of the norm, resulting in lower value in unemployment state for the workers
and lower negotiated wage.
To sum up, in an expansion there are two opposite e¤ects that tend to a¤ect the wage bargained.
On the one hand is the congestion externality which states that the decreasing economy-wide unem-
ployment makes it easier for a worker to nd a job, increasing the value in the state of unemployment
and on the other hand, the social norm which states that decreasing relevant others(household)
unemployment rate decreases the psychological well-being of the unemployed, decreasing the value
in the state of unemployment for the workers. The latter e¤ect counterbalances to some extent the
former, hindering the wage from being too responsive to outside opportunities and thus boosting
vacancy creation. In a sense, in an expansion, unemployment is not going to last long, but it is
psychologically painful even for the short period it is expected to persist8 . On the contrary, in a
recession, unemployment lasts longer but the individual shares the unemployment experience and




There are four agents in my model:
1. Households
2. Intermediate rms (Labor market)
8The idea of the search e¤ort to be used to lower wage volatility can be also seen in the standard model under
variable search intensity. The di¤erence there, is that the cost of search is a function of search intensity and not
unemployment. It is also tied to the future expected wages of the searcher upon a match. This means that in order
to have high search cost you need high wage. However high search cost according to the wage equation implied
by those models means low wage. In a sense you cannot have too high search cost and too low wages at the same
time because the way those two are dynamically related it is impossible. This limits the amplication power of the
standard variable search intensity formation as in Pissarides (2000).
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3. Final good rms or retail rms
4. Monetary Authority/Government
Figure 3 provides an outline of the model with all the agents and their basic characteristics.
There is a large number of identical households in the economy. Households are composed of
workers that may be either employed or unemployed. Households create job vacancies and also
have unemployed workers searching for vacant jobs. If an unemployed worker nds a vacant job,
they perform a match and create a di¤erentiated intermediate rm. A worker-vacancy match (job)
can only be broken at an exogenous rate. Unemployed workers need to put e¤ort in order to nd a
job each period. Upon a match, the output of any intermediate rm is the labor service of a worker
of a household. Retail rms produce using as inputs the aggregate labor service of the intermediate
rms. Those rms are producing the nal consumption good. There is a continuum of retail rms
and since there is no entry or exit, the retail sector has a unit measure. The monetary authority
and government are responsible for monetary and scal policy respectively.
3.2 Households
There is a large number of identical households in this economy, indexed by h. Each household has
the same fraction of members employed and unemployed as any other and each household has a
measure of I. Households maximize utility which is separable in three arguments:















where Cht is the aggregate consumption good chosen by the household and Ct 1 the economy-wide
consumption of the aggregate good of the previous period, G (Lhjt) is the disutility from the Lhjt
labor hours of the jth worker of the hth household at time t. The variable Nwht is the measure of
members of this household currently employed. The third argument of the utility function (7), is
the disutility from devoting luhkt units of e¤ort per unemployed worker for participating in the job
market. The household maximizes the above objective function, subject to the following budget
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Figure 3: The agents and their characteristics.
constraint:
PtCht +Bht + PtKtVht










whstds+ (1 + it 1)Bht 1





. The variable Bht represents the nominal bond holdings of the household,
KtVht the real cost of having Vht job vacancies open. The variable Kt is an adjustment cost in
vacancies and it is a function of the economy-wide number of vacancies and not in the households
control. The expression I   Nwht is the measure of unemployed workers in the given household,
Whjt is the nominal hourly wage the jth worker earns, bht is the unemployment benet, Tht are the
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transfers from the government to the household, sht is the fraction of the total shares of retail rms
the household possesses and it is the dividend the ith retail rm is o¤ering to its shareholders.
The variable NFht is the number of intermediate rms the household owns by the vacancies it posted
in the past and whst is the dividend the s
th intermediate rm owned by the household pays its
shareholders, while it is the nominal interest.
Note that households and intermediate rms are di¤erent agents, even though the household
posts the vacancies. Each job is one rm, therefore a vacancy is a rm waiting to be created.
Since any vacancy does not provide cash ows yet, someone has to pay the cost until it becomes a
job. Households provide the fee for the vacancy in exchange of the rms shares in the event of a
match. Thus, a household accumulates shares of the intermediate rms by posting vacancies that
successfully match.
Since households post the vacancies, in order to avoid the same household hiring their own
workers, I assume that there are many households of the same type. A household is too small
compared to the economy, so the probability to benet their unemployed members from posting
vacancies is zero. This will make clear what is the di¤erence between NFht and N
w
ht. The rst, (N
F
ht),
is the number of intermediate rms/jobs the household owns. The latter, (Nwht), is the number of
workers of the household that are currently employed. The distinction between the two, guarantees
that the employment level in the household is not a¤ected by the individual households vacancy
postings.
The law of motion for NFht is:
NFht+1 = (1  )NFht + qtVht (8)
There is a probability  of a job to be exogenously destroyed so the number of rms owned by the
household next period is equal to those that survived from last period (1  )NFht, plus the new
matches that took place in the current period and are ready to be productive the next. Those new
matches are depending on the number of vacancies opened by the household Vht and the probability
18





where t is the market tightness.
The law of motion for Nwht is similarly dened as





The di¤erence is that in this case, the number of household members exiting the unemployment





which is the probability, at a given period, an unemployed worker to enter the labor force. The
evolution of Nwht is out of the households control.
3.2.1 Household Problem
The households problem is the maximization of the households utility function (7) subject to the
constraints, by choosing Cht consumption, Bht bond holdings and Vht vacancies. The rst-order









ht = (Cht   Ct 1) 
along with the household budget constraint and the evolution of the intermediate rms owned by the
household, equation (8). The vacancy posting condition obtained from maximizing the households
objective with respect to Vht, is presented in the intermediate rm section below.
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3.3 Intermediate rms
A measure Nt of the whole population is employed, leaving Nt intermediate rms producing the
labor service each period. Each employed worker in this model is a di¤erentiated product since
workers are unique individuals. Call xjt the di¤erentiated labor service denoting with j 2 [0; 1] the
identity of the worker and with t the current period. The worker produces the di¤erentiated labor




where Ljt is the labor hours the worker devotes in production and Zt is productivity.
All the currently employed workers together produce the aggregate intermediate good Xt which

















and Nt is the number of employed workers, w is the elasticity of substitution between the di¤erent
good varieties. The variable  corresponds to the love of variety (LOV) for intermediate goods.










The demand for each intermediate good xjt from the retail rms is determined by the usual expen-










In my model the labor market (intermediate good sector) will be characterized by nominal
rigidities. This means that existing rms will update their price in the current period with a
probability 1   w, and the remaining fraction will set the previous periods price indexing it to
last ination rate (as Christiano et al. (2005)). The new rms created in this economy are going to
be productive next period. This means that if a match occurs in period t, the newly created rm,
produces for the rst time in t+1. The pricing decision of the new rms is particularly interesting,
since vacancy posting and job creation is a statement about the new rms. Assumptions on the
ongoing rms has little to do with job creation. I assume that newly created rms are price
adjusters. Since I argue that new rms must be wage adjusters according to evidence, it would be
legitimate, if not necessary, to assume that newly created rms are also price adjusters.
3.3.1 The value of job and unemployment
A matched job generates a surplus not only for the worker but also for the rm. This economic
rent created by the search and matching process has to be shared by workers and rms through a
bargaining process. To analyze the bargaining problem I need to nd expressions for the surpluses
of workers and rms. By adequately dening the surplus I will be able to describe the pricing
decision of rms, dene the wage and the job creation condition. Keep in mind that the following
expressions can be derived from the rst-order conditions and envelope conditions in the households
maximization problem.
Vacancies can be created simply by su¤ering a sunk cost each period, payable in units of the
nal good. The value of a vacant job to the household is characterized by the following Bellman
equation:













where FVt is the value of a vacant job and Kt is the cost of keeping a vacancy open. The remaining
terms in the expression above are simply the present discounted value of the vacancy next period.
One period ahead the job opening remains vacant with probability 1   qt, or can be transformed






is the value of a job to the rm in period
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t + 1, given it sets the optimal price pw

t+1 next period. I assume that if a rm is matched today,
then it will be productive next period where it will be a price adjuster.
In equilibrium, vacancies are freely posted until the value of a vacancy is zero, so FVt = F
V
t+1 = 0,












3.3.2 The value of a job to the rm
The value of a job to the owner of the rm that is optimizing its price in the current period, is








































is the prot of an intermediate rm currently adjusting its price. The value of a
job to the rm adjusting its price at t is equal to the current prots, plus the present discounted
value of the asset value this job is going to have next period. The next period, the rm readjusts
its price with probability 1 w and with probability w sets the same price as the previous period,
indexing it to the latest intermediate good ination. The equation for the prot of an intermediate


























3.3.3 The value of employment and unemployment































where wt = WtPt is the real wage. This Bellman equation states that the asset value of a job at
period t to the worker employed at a rm currently adjusting its price, is the wage payment, minus
the disutility of work in terms of the real good, plus the present discounted value of the job next
period. Next period, if the rm is destroyed, the worker will enter the unemployment pool, which
is worth to the worker WUt+1 units of the real good.
The value of unemployment to the worker is:
















where bt is the unemployment benet and t is the probability an unemployed worker to join the
labor force. To participate in the current-periods job market, the worker has to su¤er disutility
Gu (lut ) from l
u
t units of e¤ort, where the functional form G
u (:) is dened in (2). The value of






since a new job is always a price adjusting
rm. Also there is a probability 1   t the worker to be still unemployed in the next period with
value WUt+1. The di¤erence between (17) and (18) can be derived from an envelope condition with
respect to Nwt from the households problem.
3.3.4 The job creation condition
By using the vacancy posting condition (14), along with the value of a job to the rm, equation































The proof of the above is in Appendix F . Intuitively the above condition states, the optimal
number of vacancies should be at the point where the cost of the extra vacancy (left hand side
of (19)), equals the present discounted value of future cashows, when the vacancy nds a match,
(right hand side of (19)).
3.3.5 The Bargaining Process
The search and matching process creates economic rent/surplus that needs to be distributed among
workers and rms every period. The surplus of a match, St, is divided by Nash Bargaining between
workers and rms and it is a function of the Bellman equations presented earlier:
St = F
J
t   FVt +WEt  WUt
The total surplus is the sum of the surplus of a job to the rm F Jt   FVt and the surplus of a job
to the worker WEt  WUt . Workers and rms bargain for the wage every period such that  of the
surplus goes to workers and 1    to rms. Intermediate rms and workers that are allowed to
adjust the price of their labor service, choose the price that maximizes the total surplus, and then
split this maximized surplus according to the xed ratio as explained above. This means that rms



















and rms not currently setting their price, solve the same problem, maximizing the surplus only











  FVt 1   WEt  pwjt WUt o
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Maximizing the above with respect to wt gives the following rst-order condition for every rm
j 2 [0; Nt], price adjuster or not:
(1  )  WEt  pwjt WUt  =   F Jt  pwjt  FVt  (21)
Next I present the problem of maximizing (20) with respect to pwt , the problem of maximizing
the total surplus by choosing the appropriate price for the intermediate good (labor service).













































The proof of the above is in the Appendix B






































Firms maximize the surplus and not the prot, so the real cost of labor becomes the marginal rate
of substitution. If one wishes to deviate from the classic assumption that the cost of labor for the
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rm is the MRS, then one needs to either change the bargain problem or assume wage rigidity as
in Kuester (2007) , Christo¤el and Linzert (2005) and others. The bargaining problem does not
a¤ect the marginal cost of the intermediate rms in my specication.



































where P xt =
Pwt
Pt
is the relative price of the aggregate intermediate good.



































3.3.6 The Wage equation
The wage in this Economy is perfectly exible. This means that every period workers and rms
share the surplus created by a job match, no matter if this surplus is maximized or not. Keep in
mind that the surplus is maximized when rms are currently adjusting their prices. Also, price and
wage rigidity in this model are di¤erent things. Price rigidity (Calvo contracts) might force the
rm not to maximize its surplus, however, every rm splits the surplus between workers and rms,
therefore the wage is not rigid. The Wage equation for any intermediate rm in this model is the
following:
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The above expression is derived combining (21) along with (16), (17) and (18). The details are in
Appendix D.
The wage equation splits the surplus generated by the match. It includes terms that are match-
specic and others that depend on variables outside of the match, variables that reect the state of
the labor market. The rst and last terms in the wage equation are the only ones that depend on the
match. The rst match-specic term G(Ljt)t , is the disutility of labor in terms of the real good. More
hours of work implies more disutility from working therefore the worker needs to be compensated
more. This term is the wage that would prevail in the standard New Keynesian model without labor
market frictions. The last term
pwjt
Pt
xjt is the revenue of the rm. Higher revenue creates higher
surplus from a match leading to higher wage. Those two terms are based on the characteristics
of the specic rm and worker and they are match-specic. The remaining terms arise due to the
nature of the bargain. Workers theoretically have the option to break the negotiations with the
rm and enter the unemployment pool if the wage bargain seems unfavorable. Hence, those terms
arise in the wage equation as outside opportunities that a¤ect the relative bargaining power of the
two sides. The less severe is the outside opportunity (unemployment value) the more bargaining
power is earned by the workers. The variable bt is the constant unemployment benet. Higher
unemployment benet makes the outside opportunity (value of unemployment to worker) higher,
which increases the bargaining power of the worker and entitles her to higher wage compensation.
As I already mentioned, #t =
t
qt
= Vt1 Nt is the market tightness. The tightness #t, is high when
there are relatively more job openings than unemployed workers. In such case, for a worker to nd
a job is more likely than a vacant job to nd a match. High #t then, increases the bargain power
of workers again by improving outside opportunities (unemployment duration 1t is low), earning a
higher wage, since workers are in relatively high demand. The extra term
Gu(lujt)
t
is the disutility of
search e¤ort in terms of the real good su¤ered by each unemployed worker in order to participate
in the job market. This term also captures the e¤ect of relevant others on the value of a workers
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unemployment state, which is the psychological cost of being unemployed and searching. Again,
this term is associated with the outside opportunities of breaking the bargain.
Moreover, the appearance of marginal utility t serves the same purpose as lut , since t is also
a countercyclical variable. In an expansion, marginal utility is decreasing, implying that a utility
unit in a boom, corresponds to more units of the real good than one utility unit in a recession. If
the variety coe¢ cient was set to zero, u = 0, every worker would put xed e¤ort  every period.
A constant unit of e¤ort will require constant disutility Gu () per worker to participate in the
job market. However, this constant disutility, when transformed to units of the real good G
u()
t
becomes a procyclical variable that can, to some extend, counterbalance part of the change in
market tightness, enhancing the models amplications.
The above wage expression is the wage equation for any rm, price adjusting or not. Job creation
is a statement about the new rms, therefore the wage relevant for vacancy posting is the wage of
a price adjusting rm. However the wage response in the implied impulse responses is the average
wage of the whole economy. The aggregation of all possible wages in the economy is derived in
Appendix E.
3.4 Retail rms
Retail rms use the output of wholesale rms to produce the nal good. There is a continuum of
retail rms with measure of one. Those rms use as inputs the output of the wholesale rms, and




where Xit is the quantity of the composite intermediate good employed by the ith retail rm. Each
of those retail rms is producing a di¤erentiated product. Let chit be the demand for consumption
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Theres nominal rigidity in the market for the nal goods. A fraction  of the rms are allowed to
adjust their price each period. The ones that fail to adjust their price simply index their price to
the most recent ination rate.






























The marginal cost for the retail rms is the price P xt the intermediate rms charge for the aggregate







9 In this case the marginal product is simply Zrt a common to all retail rms productivity shock.
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which means that the relative price each individual retail producer sets is a markup over marginal
cost.
From the aggregate price index (28) I get:










3.5 Government and Monetary authority
The monetary authority conducts monetary policy following a Taylor rule. There in no government
spending in this model and the Government is following a Ricardian policy regime.
3.5.1 Government
The Government redistributes any amount raised from the issue of government bonds and revenue
from vacancy posting with the use of lump sum transfers and unemployment benets. Every period
the government keeps a balanced budget. The governments budget constraint is:
(1 Nt)Ptbt +Bt 1 (1 + it 1) = Bt +KtPtVt + Tt
Solving the government budget constraint for Tt and plugging it into the households budget con-
straint I get the aggregate resource constraint.
Ct = Yt
It is worth noting that the cost of vacancies KtVt appears in the household budget constraint but
not the resource constraint since the cost of vacancies in modeled as a tax cost.
3.5.2 Monetary authority
The monetary authority controls the nominal interest rate via a Taylor rule:
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The parameters  and y are the coe¢ cients determining the response of the Central Bank
to ination and output respectively. The coe¢ cient i is measuring the degree of interest rate
smoothing, included in the Taylor rule following the empirical work of Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(2000). The variable ut is a monetary policy shock.
3.6 Equilibrium
Since all households are the same, in equilibrium I can ignore the index h. Also in equilibrium
Nwht = N
F
ht = Nt, sht = 1 and I = 1.










t = (Ct   Ct 1) 
is the marginal utility. In equilibrium the households intermediate rm ownership becomes the
usual law of motion for employment:
Nt+1 = (1  )Nt +Ht (31)
where Ht is the matching function.
The resource constraint10 is:
Ct = Yt (32)
10Here we assume that the costs of vacancies is subsitized by the government, therefore those expenditure do not
appear in the resource constraint. Trigari (2004), Walsh (2005) and Kuester (2007) make the exact same assumption
that simplies the model especially the evaluation of its steady state.
31



















. The reason of assuming adjustment costs
in vacancies is because the search and match framework does not explain the inertial response of
vacancies observed in the data. Vacancies and wages are jump variables in the standard MP setting.
Similar assumption for vacancy costs is made by Braun (2005).
Using the F.O.C of the intermediate rms problem, equation (25) and the price of the aggregate
service (12) in log-linear form while xing the elasticity of output to labor to  = 1 (my benchmark









mr^st   P^ xt

















mr^st = `X^t   ^t + ` (w   1) A^t+k. All the steps for deriving the intermediate good Philips
curve are in Appendix B.
From the retail rms rst-order condition combined with (29), I get the usual Philips curve for








(1  ) (1  )
 (1 + )

P^ xt   zrt

(35)
By denition the relative price of the intermediate good rms is P xt =
Pwt
Pt
. Log-linearizing this, I
can express the price of the composite labor service, as a function of the intermediate and retail
good ination as follows






4 Calibration, estimation and results
I partition the parameters of the model into two sets. The rst set of parameters is:
1 = f; ; ; ; w; `; ; ; b; q; ; ; g
while the second set of parameters is:
2 = f; `u; u; ; ; ;  ; w; i; yg
I calibrate the rst set of parameters 1 and I estimate the parameters in the second set 2 to match
the model implied impulse responses after a monetary shock, with the empirical responses obtained
from a structural VAR on U.S. data.
The rst partition 1, contains parameters for which either microevidence exists, or those para-
meters are not too important for the models dynamics. The second partition 2, contains variables
that are either important for the models dynamics, or parameters for which microevidence is not
available.
4.1 Calibration
The performance criterion upon which I evaluate my model is whether it can match, up to an
acceptable extent, the impulse responses to a monetary shock, identied in an SVAR on US data.
A summary of the calibrated parameters is presented in table 1. I calibrate the parameters of
the model to values from independent studies. I set the steady state probability a vacancy to be
matched, q, to 0.7 like Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000).
I set the probability of a worker to nd a job, , to 0.6, as Cole and Rogerson (1999) implying
an unemployment duration of 1.67 quarters. By picking those values for the two probabilities I
immediate pin down the value of the e¢ ciency of the match, h, to 0.6511 . I set the unemployment
11The variable h = ~h according to our denition of the matching function
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benet b to zero12 , the lowest possible value, to make sure it is not driving my result13 .
The separation rate, , to 0.035. This implies a 6% steady state unemployment level. Hall (1999)
estimates a value of 0.08 and usually values vary around 0.08-0.1. My choice of the separation rate
is not important in achieving my target. I use a discount rate, , to 0.989, which implies a 1% real
interest rate per quarter. The elasticity of substitution for nal goods, , is set to 11, which entails
a markup of 1.1. The elasticity of substitution for the intermediate goods, w, is set to 25. Boivin
and Giannoni (2005) propose a value of 11 and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005) set
the own price elasticity of demand to 101. My value of w = 25 lies in between the values proposed
in the literature. I set the risk aversion coe¢ cient, , to 3. The inverse of labor supply elasticity, `,
is set to 10, which corresponds to a rather inelastic labor supply. It implies a labor supply elasticity
of 1` = 0:1. Trigari (2005) and Kuester (2005) use the same value. Card (1994) estimates that
1
` 2
(0; 0:5). My parameter value lies in the interval.
I set the value for the nal good price rigidity, , to 0.5, along with evidence by Bils and Klenow
(2004) suggesting prices adjust on average every two quarters. I set the nominal rate response of
the central bank to ination, , to 1.1, as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchchrist (1999).
4.2 The estimation procedure
I use the techniques introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) to bring the model to the data.
I estimate a set of parameters in order to minimize the distance between model implied impulse
responses and the responses obtained from a structural VAR on US data. More weight is placed on
the most accurately estimated responses. The exact methodology is presented in detail below.
Dene with  M (	) the vector valued function of the impulse responses from my model. It is a
function of the parameter vector 	. I denote with  V the vector of the impulse responses from the
12Setting b = 0:4 as in Shimer (2005) has a very small impact on the responses and estimated parameter and this
is one of my goals, to create a model thats not too sensitive to unemployment benet changes.
13A high value for the unemployment benet increases the steady state value of the wage while decreasing the
steady state of prots. This decreases the deviation of wage from its steady state thus increasing vacancy volatility.
This mechanism creates amplication in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2007).
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Type Par Name/Explanation Value Source
Preferences  time discount factor 0:989 real rate 1% per quarter
 elasticity of subs nal goods 11 corresponds to 1.1 markup
 risk aversion coe¢ cient 3 number usually used 2
 LOV intermediate goods 0 no Love Of Variety
w elast of substitution int goods 25 101 Christiano (2005), Kuester 23
` inverse of labor supply elast 10 1` 2 (0,0.5) Card (1994)
Labor market  s.s unemployment probability 0:6 matches un. duration of 1.67
 separation rate 0:035 Implies 6% s.s. unemployment
b unemployment benet 0 match data with lowest un. benet
q steady state vacancy probability 0:7 den Haan et al (2000)
 elasticity of int. output to labor 1
Price & policy  nal good price rigidity 0:5 Bils & Klenow (2004)
 response to ination 1:1 Bernanke et al estimate1.1 (1999)
Table 1: This is a summary of the baseline calibration.
structural VAR on US data (1955:1 to 2005:1) . The vector of estimated parameters is the vector








[ M (	)   V ]0 V [ M (	)   V ]
subject to the possible constraints imposed by the parameter space  coming from theory. The
diagonal matrix V is the matrix with diagonal elements the inverses of the VAR impulse response
variances.
4.3 The estimates
The estimates associated with preferences, labor market, price rigidity and policy parameters ap-
pear in table 2. Starting from the household preferences related parameters, the habit persistence
parameter  is estimated to be 0.96. The estimate is close to the 0.97 obtained by Kuester (2005)
and the 0.91 estimated by Boivin and Giannoni (2005). The disutility of the search e¤ort, `u, is
estimated to be 7.1, the ROPE parameter, u, is set to 0.23 and the application units, , to 1.97.
My estimates stress that unemployment for a person who is actually actively trying to nd a job is
quite painful. Specic estimates for this may not be available, but the idea that the job searching
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Type Par Name/explanation Value st.dev.
Preferences  habit persistence 0:96 (0:002)
`u disutility of search e¤ort param. 7:1 (0:073)
u ROPE coe¢ cient 0:23 (0:003)
 application units per person 1:97 (0:026)
Labor Market  elast. matching function 0:46 (0:019)
 workers bargaining power 0:81 (0:009)
 vac adjustment cost parameter 4:1 (0:413)
Price & policy w intermediate good price rigidity 0:55 (0:031)
i policy inertia 0:83 (0:005)
y policy response to output 0:2 (0:064)
Table 2: The table presents the estimated parameters from the minimum distance procedure to
match the model implied impulse responses with the empirical. The numbers in parenthesis are
standard deviations.
experience to involve frustration, stress and inevitably high disutility seems reasonable.
For the labor market parameters, the elasticity of the matching function, , is set to 0.45, close
to the value of 0.4 estimated by Blanchard and Diamond (1989). Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
estimate the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment to be between 0.5-
0.7. My estimate lies a little lower than their bound. The share of the surplus that goes to workers,
, is estimated in my model to 0.8. Although there are no microevidence for this parameter it is
close to 0.77 obtained by Braun (2005). Trigari (2004) estimates  = 0:81, while Kuester (2005)
nds  = 0:21 and Shimer (2005a) calibrates it to 0.7. The vacancy adjustment cost,  , is estimated
to be 4.1 and Braun estimates it to be around 2.
My estimate of price rigidity, w, is 0.55 close to 0.5 suggested by Bils & Klenow (2004). For
the intermediate goods Christiano et al. (2005) nd an estimate for w = 0:64. For the policy
parameters, I nd the policy inertia parameter, i, to be 0.83 as in Kuester (2005) and close
to Trigaris (2004) estimate of 0.85. The policy inertia parameter is important for the size and
persistence of the responses. An extended discussion about this fact can be found in Walsh (2005).
The monetary authoritys policy response to output y is estimated to be 0.2. Both policy values
are mostly in line with the ndings of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000).
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4.4 The models ability to match the data
I present the model implied along with the empirical impulse responses of the variables of interest
after a unit monetary shock in gure 4. The solid lines represent the responses obtained from
running a VAR on quarterly US data from 1955:1 to 2005:1, which are the same as the ones in
gure 1. The solid lines with bullet marks represent the model implied responses, and the gray
areas are 90% condence intervals. The models responses are consistent with the persistence and
cyclicality of various key macroeconomic variables in the data.
The model-predicted response of ination is as low and inertial as its empirical counterpart.
The model implied responses of vacancies, unemployment and job creation can match the level of
magnitude, as well as the persistence of the responses observed in the data.
The low and inertial response of the real wage is matched fairly well, despite the tendency of
search and matching models augmented with monetary shocks to overshoot the responses of the
real wage. Below I provide details as to how my di¤erent assumptions contribute to the picture in
gure 4.
4.5 The main ingredients
I refer to as main ingredients, the two key departures from the literature that Ive already stated
in the introduction, which are the introduction of unemployment as a social norm and nominal
rigidities in the intermediate sector. The e¤ect of each of my key assumptions on the t of the model
in gure 4 is discussed below, as well as the performance of the model when those mechanisms are
excluded.
4.5.1 The introduction of unemployment as a social norm
Figure 4 shows that the model can create enough amplication for vacancies, unemployment and
job creation. The volatilities of those variables are amplied by the introduction of unemployment
as a social norm. As Ive already covered, after an expansionary monetary shock, the unemployment
of relevant others is declining, while marginal utility is decreasing. According to the norm, and the
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decreasing marginal utility, the searching experience by each individual job seeker becomes more
unpleasant, which lowers the value of unemployment for a worker who eventually looses bargaining
power. The loss of bargaining power, hinders the wage from responding too much to the increased
likelihood of nding a job elsewhere, boosting this way vacancy creation.
Figure 5 shows the optimal t14 of the model without the social norm assumption ( = 0). I
do not present responses other than vacancies, unemployment and job creation because the model
performs fairly well in explaining those15 . Clearly the model cannot create the amplication needed
without the social norm specication which means that a non-zero  and the ROPE parameter u
play an important role in the labor market variablesvolatilities. However, some amplication is
present in the model without the social norm, since the addition of a monetary side can supply the
model with some extra volatility for vacancies and unemployment as also stressed by Barnichon
(2007). The addition of a monetary side can boost the present value of rm prots via interest
rate changes that directly a¤ect the stochastic discount factor. In other words, in an expansion the
interest rate drops and the stochastic discount factor increases, inducing vacancy creation through
higher present value of future cash ows.
To further motivate the importance of my models job market framework, I present some re-
sponses to a unit monetary shock for di¤erent degrees of ROPE, u, that governs the importance of
the measure of the supporters of the norm to the disutility of the code breakers. Figure 6 examines
the e¤ect on the model implied responses using my benchmark calibration for di¤erent values of
ROPE. It is distinct that higher degrees of the ROPE parameter u, can amplify the responses of
vacancies, unemployment and job creation in the model.
I proceed by setting u = 0 and simply vary the value of application units per person , to
observe how the countercyclicality of marginal utility can also create a procyclical response for the
perceived search e¤ort and therefore enhance the amplication of the shocks in my model. Figure
7 shows the response of vacancies, unemployment and job creation after a unit monetary shock, by
varying the application units , while keeping ROPE equal to zero. It is evident that by simply
14By optimal t I mean running the algorithm in order to match the empirical responses subject to parameter
constraints coming from micro evidence. The t of the model compare to the empirical responses is my measure of
success.
15This is expected since the amplication puzzle a¤ects primarily those three variables in this model.
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assuming the search cost is denominated in e¤ort units instead of units of the nal good (as usually
assumed in the literature), amplication can be improved in the model.
Despite the fact that the countercyclicality of both the psychological cost of unemployment and
the marginal utility contribute in amplication of the shocks in my model, the cyclicality of the
marginal utility alone cannot create the amplication needed in the data. This can be motivated
by looking at gure 8 which shows the optimal t of the model by keeping u = 0 and letting the
cyclicality of the marginal utility alone to provide amplication. I only present the labor market
variables since the remaining responses can match the empirical ones fairly well. The marginal
utility alone cannot provide enough amplication especially for vacancies and job creation. Also
a large number is needed for the vacancy adjustment cost parameter. This result species that
both e¤ects are important, even though the social norm assumption is more vital in boosting
amplication.
4.5.2 The introduction of price stickiness in the intermediate sector
The assumption of price stickiness of the form of Calvo contracts is very important in this model.
The purpose of this assumption is twofold. On the rst hand it aims in enhancing the models
persistence and on the other hand to lower the volatility of the wage response after a monetary
shock.
Many authors like Gertler and Trigari (2006), Shimer (2005b) and others have used wage rigidity
for new rms, to obtain amplication, an assumption that is rejected for its empirical validity by
Pissarides (2007) and Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens (2008). Wage rigidity for new matches might
be rejected by the evidence, but what about wage rigidity for continuing rms? Wage rigidity, at
least for continuing rms, seems to be essential to guarantee the low and inertial response of the real
wage observed in the data. The only problem is that, according to Krause and Lubik (2005), the
wage rigidity assumption could aid me in matching the wage response, but the assumption will not
contribute at all in obtaining ination inertia. As the authors report, this is because the partition
of the production activity in two sectors, makes the retail rms marginal cost una¤ected by wage
rigidity in intermediate sector, leaving the ination response barely a¤ected.
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Instead, the assumption of price rigidity for intermediate rms, not only enables the model
to match the real wage response, but also creates additional ination inertia. Calvo pricing in
the intermediate sector, enables me to take advantage of the assumption that every worker is an
intermediate rm, to boost the ination inertia and persistence implied by the model. Since an
intermediate rm currently adjusting its price uses a single workers labor hours in production,
the rm takes into consideration how the price of labor is directly a¤ected by the rms pricing
decision. In an expansion, when a price adjusting rm considers increasing its price, the demand
for its product must fall. The fall in demand induces a fall in demand for labor hours, which implies
a lower disutility of labor for the worker and therefore a lower marginal cost for the rm, which
applies pressure on the price initially set by the rm to decrease. Stated otherwise, an attempt of
an intermediate rm to increase its price, triggers a mechanism that tends to decrease the initial
price change. Thus, the changes in prices are achieved in smaller increments, increasing the degree
of strategic complementarity between intermediate rms and eventually induce smaller adjustments
in marginal costs faced by retail rms. This is an e¤ective way of increasing ination inertia in
the model. Treating each worker as a single rm will add the term 1 + `w in the denominator of
the parameter  in the Philips curve for the intermediate goods (34), that tends to decrease the
volatility of intermediate good ination and justies my choice of a fairly inelastic labor supply
(inverse of labor supply elasticity ` calibrated to 10). A discussion about the di¤erence between
rms employing a single worker against employing partly all workers in the economy can be found
in chapter 3 of Woodford (2003).
Therefore, price rigidity in intermediate rms allows me to increase the real rigidity in the model.
The important question now is: can the model match the data by simply assuming price rigidity
only in the retail sector? To answer this question, I set the parameter governing the degree of price
stickiness in the intermediate sector, w, to zero, while letting the degree of price rigidity for retail
rms, , to vary. In addition, I remove the social norm assumption temporarily for this specication.
In other words, in this exercise, theres only rigidity in the retail sector, while intermediate rms
have exible prices. Figure 9 shows the optimal t of that model for three di¤erent specications.
The lines with dot marks correspond to the optimal t when  is estimated with no restriction
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imposed on the parameter. The lines with circle marks and star marks, correspond to the same
exercise with  calibrated to 0.85 and 0.55 respectively. The estimated degree of price rigidity for
the rst specication is:  = 0:97, an implausible value according to evidence by Bils and Klenow
(2004).
What might strike you as unusual is that the responses with the dot mark can actually cre-
ate enough amplication without the need of the social norm assumption. According to Andres,
Domenech, and Ferri (2006), in a model with two sectors, increases in the degree of price rigidity





, where pwt is the price of the intermediate rm and Pt the price of the consumption
good. In an expansion, additional rigidity in intermediate rms, lowers the volatility of the price of
the consumption good Pt, therefore, the relative price of intermediate rmssignicantly increases,
boosting rm prots and vacancy creation16 . However, when the degree of price rigidity assumed
for retail rms is reduced to more acceptable values, the lines with the circle and star marks in
gure 9 show that not only the persistence in the model disappears, but also the amplication,
which can be only sustained by values of  greater than 0.9.
In addition, gure 9 shows that whichever value for  is used, the model with exible interme-
diate rms overshoots the wage responses, an observation also shown in Christiano, Trabandt and
Walentin (2009). Thus, it is evident from the above exercise that the assumption of price rigidity
in the intermediate sector is vital for preventing the wage from being too volatile after a monetary
shock.
Other than the wage, the remaining responses with star and circle marks, can match nearly none
of the empirical responses. This means that when more reasonable values for retail price rigidity
 are assumed, the models performance is not even close to satisfactory. A model with exible
intermediate rms and no social norm framework cannot account for the empirical responses. The
question now is: can a model with exible intermediate rms augmented with the social norm
assumption, account for the data without the assumption of price rigidity in intermediate rms?
The answer to this question is provided in gure 10. Clearly the model cannot match the responses,
16 In my model this e¤ect doesnt exist since the rigidity is in both sectors, therefore there is no signicant change
in relative price.
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even though the social norm assumption seems to create at least the appropriate amplication for
vacancies, unemployment and job creation. The response of ination is not persistent enough,
stressing the necessity of price rigidity in the intermediate sector that can induce greater ination
inertia and persistence in the model.
Therefore, both the assumptions of price rigidity in intermediate rms and unemployment as a
social norm are indispensable ingredients for my models performance.
4.5.3 Other ingredients
The output response in gure 4 is inertial and persistent. This is achieved through the employment
of habit persistence in preferences. The real hourly wage is also in-line with the data. The response
of the real wage is about half the response of output, along with the estimates of Giannoni and
Woodford (2005). The small and inertial response of the real wage comes from the nominal rigidities
in the intermediate sector. First of all, because the new rms are price adjusters in the rst period,
they face a decline in demand when increasing their price and employ less labor hours in production.
Thus, in the wage equation, the revenue of the new rm, which is a part of the wage (last term in
(26)), is negative during an expansion. The disutility of labor (rst term in (26)) is also negative
due to the declining demand the price adjusting rm is facing. On aggregate, this lowers the average
wage in the economy. In the standard MP model with monetary shocks, the wage tends to be way
too volatile. Similar discussion as to how to lower the wage implied by a search and matching
framework with market power, can be found in Rotemberg (2006).






. The necessity of this assumption stems from the forward looking nature of the job
creation condition, equation (19). Since rm exit in the model is quite low (as it should be according
to evidence), there is no restriction in the model as to when the intermediate rms should be created.
There is a tendency for the vacancies to be posted all at once and employment to reach its peak
fairly early. However, the adjustment costs account for the inertial response of vacancies observed in
the data. This kind of vacancy cost can be obtained by assuming time to build in vacancy creation
as assumed for jobs in this model. Lucca (2005) creates a framework where a vacancy cost of the
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type I already assumed rises. In gure 11, I examine the t of the model by assuming no vacancy
adjustment costs. It is apparent that vacancies respond immediately and unemployment reaches
its pick fast. Thus, the assumption of vacancy adjustment costs is crucial for vacancy inertia and
persistence. However, assuming vacancy adjustment costs, sacrices amplication for persistence
in the model, which implies that the virtues of the vacancy adjustment cost assumption can only
be prominent in a model employed with a good amplication mechanism.
5 Conclusion
I have presented a fairly simple new Keynesian model with search unemployment to explain the
joint response of key macroeconomic variables after a monetary shock. My main departure is the
introduction of unemployment as a social norm that incorporates the belief that the unemployed
are a burden to society, resulting in additional pressure from households upon the unemployed to
nd a job. The lower the unemployment within the household raises the support of the norm and
the greater the pressure is upon the individual unemployed. This extra psychological cost imposed
by the norm counterbalances the bargaining power gained by decreasing unemployment duration
during an expansion, preventing the wage from crowding out vacancy creation, boosting the models
amplication mechanism.
I also assume nominal rigidities (Calvo contracts) in the intermediate good sector (labor market)
in order to create enough persistence in the model. Price rigidity in the intermediate sector not
only contributes in creating ination inertia but also aids me in keeping the wage response low and
smooth. In a monetary model with no nominal rigidities in the labor market, the wage implied is
too volatile.
The model can match the impulse responses implied by a structural VAR on quarterly US data
from 1955:1 to 2005:1 and can be used for optimal monetary policy analysis. My goal was to match
the data by assuming moderate degrees of price rigidity and without the aid of wage rigidity or
unreasonable calibration, mechanisms that have been heavily criticized recently. In other words, I
tried to address the Shimer puzzle by employing monetary shocks and at the same time avoiding
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stickiness in wages and high unemployment benets.
In addition, there is an interesting interaction between the ination process and the search and
match framework created by the appearance of the extensive margin in the labor market, which
can be important for policy analysis. As a matter of fact, the ultimate goal of my paper is to show
that the model can perform well according to the facts, in order to apply the model for optimal
monetary policy design and welfare analysis. I intend to consider those extensions in the future.
Moreover, there is an interaction between the models dynamics and the degree of Love Of
Variety (LOV), , that I wish to further investigate, as the degree of ination inertia can be linked
to this parameter and also the evolution of intermediate rms.
At last, Im interested in investigating the case where the number of application units per period
 is variable and constitutes a choice variable for the household, in an attempt to address puzzles
associated with search intensity.
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A Appendix
This part derives more formally my labor market specication by dening the rm that aggregates
the individual search e¤orts more properly. There is a rm that combines households unemployed
workers individual e¤ort and sells it to households. The household uses this aggregate e¤ort to
provide the needed application units to send its unemployed workers to the job market.




ht application units in order to have their
unemployed workers participate in the job market, where Uwht = I Nwht is the number of unemployed
workers in the household. The household needs Luht aggregate e¤ort units to produce the aggregate




ht. There is a rm that takes








































































I return to the household problem to dene our job market framework more formally. The
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The budget constraint is:



















whstds+ (1 + it 1)Bht 1
where Fht = U
h
t =  (I  Nwht)
and
Nwht+1 = (1  )Nwht + t (I  Nwht)
The envelope condition with respect to Nwht determines the value of the job to the household,
important ingredient for the wage equation.
WHNwht (







t   tplhktLuhjt + t (WhjtLhjt   Ptb)
+ (1    t)EtWHNwht+1 (
t+1)
Lets simply focus on what is new in the above expression and keep in mind than in equilibrium
household specic variables are equal to the economy wide variables. Whats new in the above
























where t = tPt
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which is the Gu (lut ) term introduced in the wage equation due to my job market specication.
B Appendix
Proof of proposition 1

























Lets determine the expression in the brackets. From (16) and (17) is:
F Jt (p
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and by dening MRSt =
$GL(Lt+k)
t+k












































































































. Log-linearizing the above and using (23) at the steady state:
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Hat variables are deviations from steady state. Now lets substitute out 't+k. Lets remind the





























Log-linearizing the above expressions one by one yields:
'^t+k = mrst+k   z^t+k
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+Xt+k
Combining the above four equations I get:
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Writing the above in recursive form and rearranging I get:
gwt =
1  w (1  ) 
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In this section Ill derive the wage equation for the jth intermediate rm. For this task Ill repeat
the necessary equations. The rst is the condition that divides the total surplus between rms and
workers.
(1  )  WEt  pwjt WUt  =   F Jt  pwjt  FVt  (45)
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The next step is simply to derive the two di¤erences in brackets. The rst can be obtained by
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. Equation (45) holds for every period and for every rm, no matter
if it is adjusting its price or not. This is due to the fact that all intermediate rms negotiate their
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The di¤erence in the right hand sight of (45) is just the value of the job to the rm, where
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After cancelling out the delta terms, rearranging and use the fact that tqt = #t (where #t is market
tightness)
wjtLjt = (1  ) G (Ljt)
t











Here I derive an expression for aggregate wage. Since some rms are price adjusters and some are
not, I need to nd a way to nd an average wage for the whole economy despite the heterogeneity
between rms induced by price rigidity. I start by dening the aggregate wage to be the weighted












































































and nally the average wage is
!t =


























where rw;t;t 1 = wt
 
pwjt 1
   wt 1  pwjt 1 which is another delta (inverted delta) variable. The
integral in the last term of the expression is impossible to compute. However when log linearized




 wt 1  pwjt 1 I manage to cancel pwjt 1 away which is exactly what gave
us a hard time in the above integral.
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Log-linearizing the average wage equation I get the equation for the average economy-wide wage
!^t = (1  ) (n^t 1   n^t + w^t )  w (1  ) (n^t 1   n^t + w^t )
+ w (1  ) (n^t 1   n^t + !^t 1)





The only thing needs to be dened is rw;t;t 1. I repeat below the wage equation for a rm charging
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and the wage this same rm would pay if it failed to adjust its price next period. (Still there is
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where in both equations Dt =
G(Lt)
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Log linearizing both expressions and subtract I get
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It is clear from here that the relevant information for vacancy posting is the value of new rms and
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is useful because rst of all, the steady state is zero and also it
becomes zero when log linearized. Since Im about to log-linearize the model, the reader could as
well as ignore this delta term in the above expression, especially because with or without it the log
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linearized expressions will be exactly the same.
G Appendix
In this section I present the details of the structural VAR in gure 1. The Central Bank sets its
instrument it every period given the information available. Therefore the Taylor rule the Central
Bank uses is the following:
it = z (It) + "mt
where it is the nominal interest rate, It the information set at period t , z (:) is a linear function
and "mt is the monetary policy shock. To be able to identify the e¤ect of the monetary policy shock,
I dene the following structural VAR:
yt = + t+1yt 1 +2yt 2 + :::+pyt p +B"t (52)





In my example yt is a (8 1), A is a (8 8) matrix of constants, c and  are (8 1) coe¢ cients
for the constant and time trend t, p is the (8 8) matrix of VAR coe¢ cients for p = 1; ::; 4 and
"t is the (8 1) vector of shocks with the monetary shock "mt as the last element of this vector. I
use the usual short run restrictions in order to identify the monetary policy shock. I assume that a
policy shock only a¤ects the nominal interest rate contemporaneously. This means that monetary
policy shock a¤ects all variables other than the policy instrument after one period lag. In terms of
























































































































































































































































Figure 5: This is the optimal t of our model without our job market specication. The model adds
enough persistence and ts fairly well all variables other than the job market ones and thats the reason I
exclude the rest of the responses from the picture.


















































Figure 6: Impulse responses after a monetary shock for di¤erent values of u under the baseline
calibration.
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Figure 7: I assume a constant disutility of e¤ort (u = 0) and let the application units  vary.





















































Figure 8: This gure presents the optimal t of the model when u = 0 with a non-zero . I focus on the


































































































































































































































































































Figure 10: This is the t of the model with the social norm assumption, when there are exible prices in
the intermediate rms and the degree of price rigidity for retail rms , is set to 0.85.





















































Figure 11: Those are the optimal impulse responses after a 1% monetary shock of our model without
vacancy adjustment costs.
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R&D, Product Innovation and Employment
10 December 2010
Abstract
In this study I attempt to solve the amplication puzzle, the inability of the standard search
and matching model to account for the volatility in vacancies and unemployment, by exploring
the connection between R&D and employment. R&D a¤ects product creation and product
creation a¤ects employment. An improvement in technology benets the economy in two ways.
Same products can be produced more e¢ ciently and also new products are created. Empirical
evidence suggest that the increase in production for already existing goods does not imply
increases in employment, while new products are associated with increases in employment.
The search and matching model implies that changes in technology do not imply large changes
in employment for already existing goods which is in line with what the evidence suggest.
However, when the search and matching model applies for sectors that innovate and produce
new products, changes in employment signicantly increase. Therefore, in this model I assume
all agents need to innovate rst before they create a job opening, because rms that invent
new products are the ones that contribute more to the volatility of employment according to
the evidence. Since ideas are cheaper to implement after a technological expansion, the cost
of vacancies becomes countercyclical which boosts job creation and vacancies. The model can




The standard search and matching model by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), despite its intuitive
framework and predictions, it cannot replicate the volatility of vacancies, unemployment and market
tightness observed in empirical exercises (Shimer (2005), Fujita (2003)). There are many attempts
to resolve the issue and the solutions proposed insinuate di¤erent implications for policy analysis1 .
I follow a di¤erent route from the literature and attempt to explore how the connection between
investments in R&D and the cost of inventing new products (jobs) can increase the volatilities of
vacancies, unemployment and market tightness.
The importance of Research And Development (R&D) on technology and productivity has been
studied extensively over the past decades especially by growth economists. Although the inuence
of R&D on productivity is undisputed, the impact of innovation and R&D on employment is
controversial. R&D and innovation can a¤ect productivity through two di¤erent channels, process
innovation and product innovation. Process innovation involves original ways of producing goods
and services while Product innovation involves the creation of new or di¤erentiated products. Even
though authors like Greenan and Guellec (2000), Bogliacino and Pianta (2010) and others nd
that the e¤ect of process innovation on employment is arguable, they all agree that the e¤ect of
product innovation on employment is positive and statistically signicant. That is because process
innovation may destroy jobs since newly invented machines or advances in productivity can deem
some jobs obsolete while product innovation leads to more job openings, by unveiling new economic
channels. Some vacancies can be thought as a by-product of product innovation. Some jobs are
created by rms that create new products. My argument is that those particular rms are the ones
that make vacancies and job creation so volatile in the data. A new job can be considered as a new
rm or product and a new product is a new idea that needs to be invented which can be put to
production only after it nds a worker to put the idea to life.
I create a framework where every rm/job is a di¤erentiated product and product innovation
needs the services of an R&D rm for the idea to appear and a worker to implement this idea for
1Form more information about the issues and recent attempts you can check Cardullo (2008).
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production purposes. To open a vacancy you need a new idea for a product. The R&D rm is
charging a fee for its service and this is the only cost to post a vacancy2 . Moreover, R&D rms
invest in the quality of the ideas they provide and higher quality entails greater e¢ ciency in the
production of ideas for new products. This implies that in an expansion, vacancy demand increase
and investment in R&D rises which makes the cost of producing vacancies lower and even more
vacant positions to be opened.
The reduced cost of ideas a¤ects vacancy creation in two ways. First it lowers vacancy costs
directly and second it extends rms prots by diminishing the wage bargained by the workers.
The two main ingredients for innovative rms to exist are an idea and a worker. In an expansion,
although workers are harder to nd and expensive to keep, ideas are easier to be created and
implemented. A job is a combination of an idea and a worker and the degree up to which a rm
values each element determines its bargaining power and the wage it pays its worker. However,
when one element becomes more valuable, the other becomes more cheap, balancing the bargaining
power of the rm, leaving the wage less responsive and prots along with incentives to post vacancies
more volatile. In other words, lower vacancy costs tend to decrease the wage from a job match
because the outside opportunity of the rm (the vacancy state) becomes more benecial whenever
bargain power in the current match slips from the hands of the rm and vice versa.
The addition of investments in R&D can amplify the volatilities of vacancies, unemployment and
market tightness considerably. The model cannot account for the volatility of the real wage, but
could be considered as part of a more complex model where some kind of wage rigidity is present
to keep the wage from overshooting. The connection of R&D investment and job creation might be
one of the missing links in the search and matching theory that may need to be further explored
by researchers.
The following sections include the following features: The exploration of the connection between
R&D and employment along with some empirical evidence by other authors. A detailed derivation
of the R&D sector that explicitly denes the price of a vacancy as a function of aggregate vacancy
2There could be also a cost to advertise the vacancy which is the standard assumption in the search and matching
models. Refraining to assume that on top of the cost to come up with the idea to open a vacancy there are advertizing
costs does not change the results of this paper.
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demand. After the R&D sector is fully dened, I present the rest of the model, followed by the
calibration section and the results.
2 The Impact of R&D on Employment
Does innovation and new technology create or destroy jobs? This is a rather di¢ cult question that
has been bothering researchers from classical economists to today. During the rst industrial revo-
lution, British workers in fear of technological unemployment destroyed the machines in industrial
areas as well as the countryside. Technology can actually destroy a lot of jobs rapidly but can also
create some. Lots of workers have been replaced by machines during the last few decades where
technological progress has become more pervasive. However, technological progress is a rather vague
idea as technological innovation could mean di¤erent things. Technological progress could either
come in the form of process innovation or in the form of product innovation.
Process innovation involves advances in the way of producing certain goods and services. Process
innovation is the form of technological progress that could rapidly shed a large number of jobs in-
stantaneously, at least in the short run. However, economists responded to the critics of technolog-
ical innovation by putting forward a theory that Marx called "compensation theory". The theory
includes di¤erent compensation mechanisms in various markets that can actually counterbalance
the initial shed of jobs due to process innovation. Empirical analysis by various authors such as
Greenan and Guellec (2000), Pianta (2005), Garcia et. al (2002), Evangelista (2000), Blanchower
and Burguess (1998) report controversial evidence about the relation between process innovation
and employment.
Product innovation is a form of technological progress that involves the creation of new or
di¤erentiated products. Product innovation can create new economic branches along with new job
positions. It is the most "labor-friendly" form of technological progress. Despite any ambiguity
in the impact of process innovation on employment, there is a consensus that product innovation
stimulates employment as proclaimed by Harrison et al (2005), Peters (2005), Bogliacino and Pianta
(2010), Vivarelli and Pianta (2000), Edquist, Hommen and McKelvey (2001), Freeman and Soete
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(1994) and others. Moreover, R&D expenditures can boost product innovation which consequently
increase job creation. The direct impact of R&D on employment is investigated by Bogliacino and
Vivarelli (2010).
In this paper I impose a rather strong assumption. I assume that for a job to be created, an idea
of a new product needs to be generated. This is not entirely realistic since some jobs are simply
created along premises that already exist. For example, if I have a secretary and I wish to hire
another one, then there is no need for an idea or research or R&D of any sort to create this job
opening. Not all jobs come from new and innovative products or ideas. Nevertheless, I make this
assumption based on the empirical evidence about the e¤ect of product innovation I have already
discussed. The uctuations in employment tend to be related to the e¤ect of new product creation.
Therefore, I assume that in the model economy there are only rms that are innovative. You could
think of this model as a simplied version of a relatively more complicated model, where there are
two types of rms. Firms that do not innovate and rms that innovate and produce new goods. The
rms that create already existing jobs with no need of R&D are going to have the same structure as
the standard search and matching model where the e¤ect of a technology shock on job creation in
that sector would be minimal. The other sector, containing the rms that are creative to the point
of designing new products, is going to be the one that is going to generate most of the volatility
in employment, which is in line with what the empirical evidence suggest. In my model I discard
completely the rst sector and just assume that all new jobs produce new and innovative products
since that particular sector is going to be the one that creates the largest employment uctuations
in the rst place.
The above authors have a lot of explanations as to why process innovation might not necessarily
be translated to more jobs. My own explanation lies exactly along the lines of the standard search
and matching models woes. The search and matching model predicts that after a productivity
shock, job creation and employment are barely responsive. This should not be a problem at all
since process innovation actually does not seem to create new jobs. Even though the e¤ect of a
technology shock raises productivity and output, the e¤ect on employment is rather mild. Product
innovation is the one that is associated with employment uctuations. The standard search and
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matching model assumes that increases in productivity lead to a very mild increase in the creation
of more of those same rms, which is what the empirical evidence suggest. If one is interested to
see after a appositive productivity shock,whether many more of the same jobs/rms are going to
appear, the search and matching model gives actually the right answer. Not many of the same
jobs will suddenly appear. If we allow new products to be created, the search and matching model
-as I tend to show in this paper- implies that a positive technology shock can amplify job creation
signicantly, exactly what those authors predict the connection between product innovation and
technology should be.
Specically, in this paper I assume that an increase in employment can only be achieved through
product innovation. Every rm is a single job producing a di¤erentiated product. Therefore, for a
rm to be created, a di¤erentiated product needs to be created and a worker needs to be employed.
I create the necessity for R&D services for agents seeking to create vacancies. I assume vacancies
are potential di¤erentiated products that need to be developed and their development needs ideas.
R&D rms are in charge of providing ideas for a fee and also invest in the quality of their services.
In a sense, R&D rms are in charge of product innovation. The higher the quality investment in
R&D, the more e¢ cient those research rms are in producing ideas or vacancies. Higher quality
research makes ideas oating from the R&D sector more e¤ective and the fee they charge for each
vacancy lower. In an expansion, vacancies increase and R&D rms invest more in the quality of
their service. Improved quality enhances R&D rmsproductivity and higher productivity in R&D
makes the cost of vacancies to drop, creating another wave of potential job positions, boosting
overall vacancies and job creation. In other words I create a theoretical framework where vacancies
are considered as ideas of new product along with an opening for a worker to put this idea into
production. I demonstrate that the additional impact of improvements in R&D on employment
is important for job creation and this is something that might have been ignored in the search
and matching literature so far. Product innovation is important for employment and the level of
R&D can boost the capacity of ideas produced. Thus, as suggested by the empirical evidence, the
cyclicality of R&D might be one of the driving forces of the large cyclical variations in employment
that is missing from the standard search and matching model and this is what the purpose of this
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paper is all about.
3 R&D Firms
Jobs in my model are di¤erentiated products, therefore vacancies are ideas about di¤erentiated
products and the invention of a vacant position needs research. Consumers in the economy are
capable of producing ideas and ideas are the main ingredient for vacancy creation. Consumers are
basically the R&D rms even though the specication of who provides the ideas is of minor impor-
tance. Therefore theres a market for ideas and agents attempting to create a rm through vacancy







where Lvst is part of the nal good and vst the number of ideas the s
th individual provides. In some
sense this is the amount of food needed to produce ideas. Its basically food for thought.
The aggregate research service or vacancies produced Vt in this sector is a combination of all











The cost minimization problem of the agent that purchases this aggregate research good in an









where pvst is the price the individual R&D rm charges for its services. Also from the same cost
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which states that the aggregate price is the aggregate of the individual quality adjusted prices.













The prot maximization problem of the individual R&D rm which decides the price and in-
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I drop the s subscript because every individual is identical and the decision problem is the same
77










































Use the fact that every research rm charges the same price, equation (3) and the relative price of

























The F.O.C with respect to qt is





























3.1 The Vacancy Cost
Start from the cost of vacancies as a function of both the aggregate vacancy number Vt and quality














If  < 1, it means the production of ideas exhibits increasing returns to scale and therefore the
cost of a vacancy would be decreasing without the need of quality to play any particular role. The
negative relation between vacancies and its cost can be guaranteed by the increasing returns to
scale assumption. I do not intent to assume increasing returns to scale thus I set  = 1. My goal
in this section is to eliminate qt in the above equation to derive an expression between the cost of
vacancies and the aggregate demand for vacancies in the economy.
In order to be able to observe what the introduction of quality in R&D can imply for vacancy























The cost of vacancies is a constant times a function of vacancies
P xt = V
  1+
t (11)





1+ is that constant. Equation (11) summarizes the result of the paper and I
am going to refer to it immediately after I restate the puzzle and my goal in the next section.
3.2 Puzzle and Solution
The amplication puzzle arises in the search and matching model due to the wage implied by the
specic bargaining problem faced by both rms and workers according to this framework. The
problem is that the wage is too dependent on the value of workers outside opportunity which
is unemployment. After an expansionary productivity shock, vacancies rise and unemployment
drops. The few unemployed are facing a large number of available jobs which gives employed
workers bargaining power. The employed worker can reach for a higher wage by threatening to
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break the current match now that the unemployment duration has dropped signicantly. The rm
is in a bad position to negotiate because if the match breaks, the average duration of a vacancy
is relatively high compared to unemployment duration. Therefore the worker can negotiate such
a high wage that basically diminishes rms prots and the incentive to post vacancies to begin
with. In the standard search and matching model, the wage absorbs most of the e¤ect of the shock
leaving prots and consequently vacancies barely responsive.
However, this is the e¤ect of a technology shock on vacancies and employment if more of the
already existing jobs are created. The story is di¤erent for rms that innovate. Even before I
present the whole model, the main result can be observed simply by looking equation (11) that I
repeat below
P xt = V
  1+
t
This equation states that the cost of a vacancy is decreasing in the number of vacancies demanded.
The above relationship arises due to quality improvements by the research rms. The greater the
vacancy demand, the larger the prot the R&D rm experiences and thus the larger the capability
of investment in the quality of the rms product. The quality improvement increases productivity
and enables the R&D rm to further decrease its cost.
After a positive technology shock, the cost of a vacancy drops according to the equation above
which can boost job creation and vacancies through two channels. The rst channel is the obvious
one. Lower cost of vacancies means more vacancies posted. However there is another channel
that is not as obvious. Lower cost of a vacancy a¤ects the relative bargaining power between nal
good rms and workers. In an expansion the duration of a vacancy increases, but the cost of a
vacancy drops since R&D rms can improve their quality. Lower vacancy cost puts rms back into
the negotiations game. It enables the rm to deny a too high wage to the worker since upon a
destruction of a match, the rm is not in a bad situation anymore. The average vacancy duration
may be large in a boom but according to (11) the vacancy cost decreases improving rmsoutside
opportunities which is the value of the vacancy state. This prevents the wage from absorbing most
of the e¤ect of the shock as in the standard search and matching model, thus boosting prots and
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Figure 1: The agents in the model, their basic interactions and the ow of goods and services.
the incentive to post even more vacancies.
A job has two elements when only the innovative rms are considered. The rst element is
an original idea and the second a worker to put this idea into the production process. Along the
business cycle the scarcity of those elements varies. Novertheless, it varies in such a way that when
workers are more scarce, ideas are more wasy to grasp or impliment and vice versa, meaning that
the rm does is not facing a wage that absorbes most of the e¤ect of the shock anymore.
Therefore, innovative rms face a quite di¤erent bargaining problem than usual rms and this is
the main reason that the search and matching model fails to explain the amplication puzzle. How-
ever, the standard model actually predicts that advances in technology may enhance productivity
or output but not employment as much simply because all rms in the standard model produce
the same product. When rms that create new products are examined, the wage structure implied
from the search and matching model does not hinder job creation to expand.
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4 The Model
The model consists of three agents as can be seen in gure 1. Households that choose consumption
every period and also post vacancies which when successfully matched can become a rm with the
household as the only shareholder. Vacancies are new products or jobs and their creation needs
the services of creative minds. R&D rms provide those ideas to households trying to open job
positions in exchange for a fee. Moreover households provide labor to the nal good rms which
use it as an input. The number of employed workers, hours and wages are determined as in the
traditional search and matching model. Final good rms use labor to produce the nal good which
is partly consumed by the households and the rest is used as an input by R&D rms for the creation
of ideas for product (or job) innovation.
4.1 Household Problem
There is a large number of identical households each containing Ih members. Therefore all house-
holds are identical supporting market completeness as in Merz (1995). A measure of Nwht household
members are employed while the rest Ih   Nwht remains unemployed. Households get utility from
consumption and disutility from labor. In addition, households post vacancies in an attempt to
gain ownership of nal good rms. Every consumer in the economy employed or not is able to
produce ideas that are a necessary ingredient for job creation. There are many households each
maximizing the following utility function:











Cht +Bht + P
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vhstds+ (1 + it 1)Bht 1
Nht+1 = (1  )Nht + gtVht
where Cht is the consumption chosen by the household h, Ct 1 the aggregate consumption, Lhjt
the labor hours in production from the Nwht employed workers and L
v
hkt the e¤ort chosen in the
production of ideas from each of the Ih members of the household. Real Bond holdings is Bht, P xt the
price R&D rms charge per vacancy and Vht the vacancies the household posts. The unemployment
benet received by the households unemployed Ih Nwht is bt. The household receives whjtLhjt wage
income from the Nwht employed workers. The household earns dividends from consumption good
rms it and research rms vhst, the rms providing the "ideas". The number of rms owned
by the household Nht+1 next period is the surviving rms from the previous period (1  )Nht
(rms are destroyed with probability ) plus the vacancies the household posts Vht weighted by the
probability of a vacancy to match gt.






where ht is marginal utility.
The rst order condition for vacancies implies
P xt
gt




Moreover, in equilibrium the equation of the evolution of the economy-wide employment is





is the constant returns to scale matching function.
4.2 The Bellman Equations
4.2.1 The rms
The value of a vacancy to the rm is:
FVt =  P xt + gtEtQt;t+1F Jt+1 + (1  gt)EtQt;t+1FVt+1 (13)
where P xt is the cost of a vacancy. Next period the vacancy becomes a job with value F
J
t+1
weighted by the probability of a vacancy to be matched gt or it remains a vacancy with probability







The value of a job to the rm is:
F Jt = t + (1  )EtQt;t+1F Jt+1 (14)
where t is the prot of the nal good rm which survives the next period with probability 1 .







and after using (14) we get the job creation condition which can also arise from the household
maximization problem with respect to Vht
P xt
gt





The value of a job to the worker is:





(1  )WEt+1 + WUt+1

(16)
where wtLt is the wage received and G (Lt) is the disutility of labor in utility units and t the
marginal utility. Next period the job is either continued or terminated with probabilities 1  and
 respectively.
The value of unemployment to the worker is:




t+1 + (1  t)WUt+1

(17)
where bt is the unemployment benet and t the probability corresponding to the event of a worker
to nd a job.
4.2.3 Bargaining and wage
Firms maximize the surplus from a match by choosing the price. The total surplus is the sum of
the surpluses a successful match generates.
St = F
J
t   FVt +WEt  WUt
Firms and workers engage into Nash bargaining and split the surplus by assigning  share to the
workers and the rest 1   to the rms. The above procedure is similar to maximizing the objective
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The rst order condition results to:
(1  )  WEt  WUt  =   F Jt   FVt 
Substitute in the above the the value of a job to the rm equation (14), the value of a job to
the workers equation (16) and the value of unemployment equation (17). This implies the wage
equation is


















+ P xt #t + 
Yt
Nt
There are Nt employed individuals or equivalently, there are Nt nal good rms. Each rm uses
Ljt units of the workers e¤ort as input to produce the di¤erentiated good yjt via the following
production function
yjt = ZtLjt (19)
where Zt is an AR(1) productivity shock following
Zt = (1  z) + zZt 1 + "t
and "t is iid. The aggregate consumption good is a combination of all individual rmsoutputs.


































The rms maximize the total surplus from a match by choosing every period the price they
charge for their good. The total surplus to be maximized is
St = F
J
t   FVt +WEt  WUt (22)
From the Bellman equations of the precious section substitute the rms and workers surpluses in
the above for the total surplus, to nd the surplus as a function of pjt the price the rm charges
for its services. Moreover, use the fact that the prot is jt =
pjt
Pt
yjt   wtLt. After the above









subject to the demand function (21), and the production function (19). The function 	t =
G(Lt)
t
is the disutility from providing Lt labor e¤ort in terms of the real good. The rm maximizes the
surplus by treating 	t as xed. For further details on this result check Koursaros (2009).
The rst order condition implies the usual monopoly result that the price is a markup over the
real marginal cost. Ignore the j subscript since all rms are identical. The relative price of a single
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Plug this into the wage equation (18) to get










+ P xt #t + 
Yt
Nt





= (1  ) 1 + `
 (1 + `)
Yt
Nt
  (1  ) bt   P xt #t
Keep in mind that the prot of the rm which appears in the job creation condition (15) and the
objective of the rm are not the same. The rm maximizes the surplus and not the prot. The
prot is part of the surplus. However, investors care about cash ows and not the surplus, therefore,
the job creation condition is a statement about cash ows.
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4.2.4 The solution
The following system characterizes the solution:
The feasibility constraint:
Yt = Ct + P
x
t Vt (23)
where I assume the vacancy costs are subsidized by the government.
The law of motion of employment:
Nt+1 = (1  )Nt + h (Vt) (1 Nt)1  (24)
The job creation condition:
P xt
gt




The prot of the rm producing the consumption good:
t = (1  ) 1 + `
 (1 + `)
Yt
Nt
  (1  ) bt   P xt #t (26)


































Equations (23) to (29) characterize the solution.
4.2.5 The price of ideas and vacancy dynamics
It is easy now to show the mechanism that can boost job creation by examining the appropriate
equations as I have already presented all the equations governing the dynamics in the model. Solve






(1  )j Qt;t+j+1t+j+1 (30)
The above equation states that in equilibrium the cost of a vacancy is P xt (the per unit of time
cost) times the duration of a vacancy 1gt . The cost should be equal to the present discounted value
of all future prots the job is expected to produce for as long it is expected to survive. During an
expansion, jobs are created and vacancies rise. However according to (11) the cost of a vacancy
diminishes since the cost is decreasing in vacancies due to investments in quality that boosts research
productivity. Therefore the rst channel is through lowering the left hand side of the job creation
condition which represents the cost of a vacancy.
The second channel in which the cost of a vacancy P xt a¤ects job creation is through prots t
in the above equation and specically through the wage. Remember the wage is part of the rms
prot and is determined by:










+ P xt #t + 
Yt
Nt
The cost of a vacancy P xt a¤ects the bargaining power of rms, thus lower P
x
t grants more negoti-
ating power to the rms because the rm can nd another worker less costly. Therefore, during an
expansion, vacancies are created and the increase in vacancies induces a decrease in prices through
improvements in quality. The decrease in the cost of a vacancy boosts vacancies through lower costs
(left hand side of (30)) and through higher prots (right hand side of (30)). The latter comes from
the dependence of the wages on outside factors such as the cost of a vacancy. During a bargaining
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with the worker, the rm has the option to leave the bargaining stage and keep the job vacant.
The cost of the vacancy is the rms outside option and lower costs give bargaining power to rms
and eventually lead to a lower wage for the worker. The lower wage increases rms prots and
investors incentives to open vacancies.
The story so far might have created a logical paradox. I assumed the cost of a vacancy involves
the cost of producing ideas. The reader might be wondering how does that enter the wage equation.
In the wage equation, the cost of a vacancy enters as an outside option for the rm in the case the
match is destroyed. If a match is destroyed, the ideas still exists. Why would the rms need to
recreate an idea if a match is destroyed? I assume that upon destruction rms and ideas disappear.
This might not be entirely realistic but if one thinks about the cost of rm and job destruction,
it certainly involves the destruction of ideas, capital and human capital, stocks that need some
di¤erentiation to be able to reused in the production process again.
5 Calibration and results
In the following sections I calibrate the model to common parameter values either from estimates
from US data or values obtained by other macroeconomic studies. I simulate the model in order to
provide second moments for the volatilities of vacancies, unemployment, tightness, output, wages,
hours and quality in R&D. The volatilities implied by the model are compared to the ones from
quarterly US data from 1955-2005.
The variables in the US data are basically: the log of quarterly real GDP, the annualized
quarterly rate of change in the CPI, the log of Help-Wanted advertising, the civilian unemployment
rate, the log of job creation for continuing establishments in the manufacturing sector, the log of
average hourly earnings in the business sector, the log of total hours in the business sector and the
e¤ective federal funds rate.
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Par Name/Explanation Value
 time discount factor 0:989
 elasticity of subs nal goods 25
 risk aversion coe¢ cient 3
 habit persistence 0:7
 elast. matching function 0:6
 workers bargaining power 0:5
 quality coe¢ cient 2:5
N steady state employment 0:9
` inverse of labor supply elast 10
z AR coe¢ cient of shock 0:8
 s.s unemployment probability 0:63
 separation rate 0:07
b unemployment benet 0:4
q steady state vacancy probability 0:7
Table 1: This is a summary of the baseline calibration.
5.1 Calibration
The time discount factor is set to 0:989. The elasticity of substitution  for nal goods is set to 25
which lies between Boivin and Giannonis (2005) estimate of 11 and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Lindes (2005) estimate of 101. The risk aversion coe¢ cient  is set to 3 and the habit
persistence  to 0.7. The elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment is set to
0.6 which lies in the interval of acceptable values (0.5-0.7) according to Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001). The workers share of the surplus  is set to 0.5. This is the usual value assumed in the
literature since empirical work has no predictions for this parameter.
The quality coe¢ cient is set to 2.5. Empirical evidence do not exist for this parameter either.
The inverse labor supply elasticity is set to 10 as in Trigari (2005). The steady state employment
rate is set to 0.9 which along with a separation rate of 0.07 (close to 0.08 by Hall (1999)) implies
a steady state probability to get a job  to 0.63 which is close to unemployment duration of 1.67
observed in US data. The unemployment benet is set to 0.4 which implies forty percent of steady
state income. The steady state vacancy probability is set to 0.7 as common in the literature. The
coe¢ cient of the lag of the technology shock is set to 0.8. The model is unable to create endogenous
persistence if this coe¢ cient is set to zero.
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Stat US M1 M2 M3
Technology z   1:03 0:9 0:73
Output Y 1:58 1:58 1:58 1:58
Vacancies V =Y 8:85 3:44 6:68 10:7
Tightness #=Y 16:33 4:03 8:21 13:3
Unemployment u=Y 7:83 1:42 2:7 4:4
Wage w=Y 0:69 1:72 1:85 2
Hours L=Y 1:15 0:3 0:3 0:33
Quality q=Y     3:38 3:01
Table 2: This is a table of second moments. The rst column of numbers are second moments from
the US data. The moments with the label M1 come from a model without quality boost. The
moments under M2 are the moments under the benchmark calibration.
5.2 Result
The result is displayed in table 2. The rst column of numbers contains statistics from the US
data. M1 to M3 are second moments implied by three models for di¤erent values of the quality
parameter . The model M1 corresponds to a model with the same parameter values as table 1
except for setting  = 0, a model with no quality update and simply constant cost of vacancies. M2
corresponds to a model with  = 1 and M3 is a model following the benchmark calibration with
 = 2:5. Clearly the volatilities for vacancies, unemployment and tightness implied by M1 are too
far from the ones empirically observed in US data.
However, M2 and M3, models that allow R&D rms to invest in quality appear to be much
superior to M1 in terms of the volatilities of the labor market variables. M3 might not be perfect
but improves the standard models performance in creating volatilities for vacancies, unemployment
and tightness by about 300%. Figures 1 to 3 present impulse responses to a productivity shock for
vacancies, unemployment and market tightness for di¤erent values of the quality parameter . It
is clear from the responses that the addition of quality improvements can boost the volatilities of
those variables.
This might be one of the missing links in the search and matching framework. R&D and
improvements in R&D are important for product creation which is also important for job creation.
This model shows how the incentives to improve quality in R&D can boost product innovation
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which implies increases in employment as the empirical evidence also suggest.
All three models overshoot the wage volatility. Wage rigidity could x this issue even though
wage rigidity should be imposed only on existing rms to be consistent with evidence by Pissarides
(2007) and Haefke Sonntag and van Rens (2007). In the current paper I do not propose a mechanism
to account for the volatility of the real wage, however wage rigidity for ongoing rms can be the
best candidate.
Employment is not as volatile and makes tightness not as volatile as it could be. The reason
is the equation for the evolution of employment (12). It behaves the same way as adjustment
costs. The specication sacrices volatility for persistence. Removing this assumption will remove
all persistence in the model. One of the biggest challenges in this literature is to create both
enough amplication and persistence at the same time. However, persistence usually comes at
a cost of reducing amplication considerably and as I should have mentioned this far, vacancies,
unemployment and market tightness are very volatile variables.
6 Conclusion
I developed a model that explores the connection between investment in R&D as a means to boost
employment. There is a big literature supporting the idea that product innovation can boost
employment and R&D investment can trigger higher product innovation and higher employment. I
argue that this might be one of the missing links in the search and matching literature. Vacancies
can be considered as ideas that are provided by R&D rms. Larger investment in R&D can boost
the ability to innovate for the economy which creates more di¤erentiated products and jobs.
This framework can be a part of a more sophisticated macroeconomic model that could capture
even more stylized facts. For example the model possesses no mechanism to match the very low
volatility of wages that is observed in the data. This paper is mainly concerned with the volatilities
of vacancies, unemployment and market tightness. For those three variables, the model can boost
their volatilities compared to the standard model by 300%.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of vacancies under the benchmark calibration for di¤erent values of the quality
paremeter .























Figure 3: Impulse responses of unemployment under the benchmark calibration for di¤erent values of the
quality paremeter .
98























Figure 4: Impulse responses of market tightness under the benchmark calibration for di¤erent values of
the quality paremeter .
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The Search and Matching Model when Agents are Learning
20 May 2011
Abstract
This study investigates the macroeconomic implications from introducing perpetual learn-
ing in a simple search and matching model. When the agents with rational expectations are
replaced with agents that are boundedly rational, the volatilities of vacancies, unemployment
and market tightness are increased signicantly. Job creation is connected to the present dis-
counted value of future cash ows, which means that if agents do not form rational expectations,
their forecasts of future cash ows are subject to periods of either excess optimism or excess
pessimism. Those extra distortions of the agentsforecasts amplify the volatility of job creation.
Therefore, the amplication puzzle arising from the search and matching model might be due
to the strong assumption that agents are rational; thus, when agents need to form multiperiod
forecasts using past data as in Preston (2005) and Eusepi and Preston (2010), the search and
matching models amplication potential is enhanced. The model can replicate moments from
quarterly US data from 1955Q1 to 2007Q4. However the more amplication added to the
model through higher gain parameter, the further the correlations generated by the model are
from the ones obtained from US data. That is because higher amplication induces vacancies
to uctuate around the rational expectations equilibrium less smoothly. Moreover, higher am-




The search and matching model introduced by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) has been criticized
by various authors such as Shimer (2005), Fujita (2004) and others for its ability to match various
statistics from the US data even though as a rst pass it seems to outperform the standard RBC
model (Merz (1995), Adolfatto (1996)). Specically, the standard search and matching model
cannot explain the amplication in vacancies, unemployment and market tightness that is observed
in the US data, a drawback that is referred to as the amplication puzzle. Moreover, the model
fails to provide enough propagation either, as the e¤ects of the shock disappear immediately after
the shock dies out. A survey about the problems and possible xes and critics on the search and
matching model can be found in Cardullo (2008).
Various attempts to enhance the performance of the standard model have been reported. The
rst wave of attempts involved changes in the wage formation such as including wage rigidity. Those
attempts are criticized by Pissarides (2007) and Haefke, Sonntag and van Rens (2008) implying
wages for new rms to be too sticky, an assumption rejected by empirical evidence. Another wave
of attempts aimed at changing the calibration in the standard model as in Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2007). However, the higher amplication comes at the cost of making the model too sensitive
to certain policy variables like unemployment benets. The most promising attempts seem to be
those that aim at changing the models specication. Although there are numerous attempts to
change the model specication to address the issues I already discussed, in my knowledge there is no
attempt to deviate from the rational expectations assumption, a channel that might be important
in the alignment of the models predictions with the data.
The amount of vacancies to be posted every period in a standard search and matching model are
determined by the cost of posting a vacancy and the present value of all future cash ows the job
is expected to create in the future. The assumption that agents have rational expectations is very
crucial in the determination of vacancies and jobs. If agentsforecasts are fully specied, vacancies
are barely volatile. However, once deviating from the rational expectations assumption and assume
bounded rationality, agents need to provide forecasts of variables outside their control such as future
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dividends, rm revenues and labor supply as well as vacancy costs. Possible misspecications in
the formation of those beliefs are going to have a big impact on vacancy and job creation.
To formulate the above concept in the search and matching framework, I assume the agents have
a fully specied belief system but do not have complete knowledge about equilibrium determination;
that is they do not know how shocks and state variables get mapped into prices and policy variables.
Thus, the agents understand that the solution to their optimization problem implies every variable is
a linear function of the state variables and shocks. What agents do not know exante is the coe¢ cients
that dene this linear relation between every variable and the state variables, something known if
agents are fully rational. This deviation from rational expectations through learning is discussed
extensively in the adaptive learning literature in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). I assume agents
form their beliefs for the future through a constant gain learning algorithm. However, I postulate
that agents do not make forecasts of future variables only a period in advance which is the common
assumption in the learning literature. Agents in this model need to make multi-period forecasts as
dened in Preston (2005) and Eusepi and Preston (2010). Their nding is that this deviation from
the literature can enhance the volatility of the standard learning model compared to the common
specication in Evans and Honkapohja. Since the amplication problem in the search and matching
framework is a severe one, I choose to assume agents need to form multi-period forecasts as a way
to confront the issue.
Therefore, in this study agents know that the solution to their optimization problem implies that
every variable in equilibrium is a linear combination of the models state variables and shocks. The
only missing piece for the agents is the determination of the forecasts for all the forward looking
variables in their rst order conditions. Since the agents realize that those future variables are
linear combinations of the state variables, forecasts can be constructed as long as estimates for
those coe¢ cients of the state variables can be obtained. The coe¢ cients are obtained through a
recursive least squares algorithm with constant gain. The parameters are updated period by period
and they are a function of past data.
The agents are boundedly rational in the sense that they make forecasts of future variables
using a misspecied model assuming that over the forecast horizon forecasts will remain intact
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when in fact they will be reversed later when new information arrives. Learning distorts the xed
point mapping from perceived to actual law of motion leading to situations of excess optimism or
pessimism. In an expansion, labor productivity increases and rm prots increase as well. Agents
about to post vacancies need to forecast future cash ows from rms and those forecasts are formed
from past realizations of dividends. The increase in prots makes agents posting vacancies to be
too optimistic about future returns and they end up posting more vacancies than what a rational
agent would. The misspecied beliefs boost the volatility of vacancies, unemployment and market
tightness. Under bounded rationality, agents behave irrationally in the sense that they form beliefs
through a misspecied model, beliefs that agents assume will hold for the periods to come, even
though they are eventually going to revise them.
There are a few papers that have demonstrated that the standard adaptive learning model can
imply no signicant di¤erences from the rational expectations model as claimed by Williams (2003).
In addition, Huang, Liu and Zha (2008) conrm the claim for high training periods and low gain
parameter. However, Eusepi and Preston (2010) found that by forcing the agents to make decisions
via multi-period forecasts, the di¤erences between the learning and rational expectations models
become very signicant. This is the formulation I am going to assume and under it, the model can
match standard deviations from quarterly US data from 1955:Q1 to 2007:Q4.
Even though increasing the gain parameter can enhance the models amplication potential,
learning seems to deteriorate the models performance in matching rst order autocorrelations and
correlations of the variables under scrutiny. This happens for a couple of reasons. First, opti-
mism or pessimism about future returns induces uctuations in consumption around its rational
expectations response which forces the vacancy schedule to do the same. Moreover, there is no en-
dogenous job destruction. If job creation is very volatile compared to the rational expectations case
but output is to remain almost the same between the two models, then job creation and vacancies
under learning have to simply uctuate violently around the rational expectations equilibrium. For
example, in an expansion, consumption is low compared to a rational agents since consumers form
beliefs from past data. their decrease in consumption leads to an big increase in vacancies. Next
period consumers start to believe that income is going to be high forever and increase consumption
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too much. This makes vacancies too low that period and the story continues going from too high
to too low vacancy creation. This implies that vacancies are going to uctuate violently around
the rational expectations case, a behavior that forces all variables to be less autocorrelated and the
correlation of vacancies and unemployment (Beveridge curve) less negative or even positive after a
specic value for the gain parameter.
The second section presents the model where all the details about the agents and their decisions
as well as the bargaining problem of the rm and worker are determined. Moreover in the same
section, I present the formation of beliefs which eventually inuences the actual law of motion of
the model economy. The third section presents the calibration along with the results.
2 The Model
I develop in the next section a simple search and matching model in the spirit of Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994) in discrete time. There is a large number of identical households containing
a continuum of consumers each. This assumption guarantees market completeness as in Merz
(1994) because each household has the same ratio of employed to unemployed people and the same
portfolio each period. Households choose every period their consumption basket and vacancies
to post. Posting vacancies is the means of job creation as in the standard model. A household
that manages to successfully create a rm/job by posting a vacancy is the rightful owner of the
particular rm and is entitled to any dividend the rm can pay for as long as it survives. Firms
are jobs consisting of a single worker each and they appear and vanish according to the standard
search and matching literature.
The main di¤erence is the departure from the rational expectations framework by assuming that
agents are learning and can thus have non rational beliefs when forming expectations. The learning
framework is of the kind presented in Preston (2005) and Eusepi and Preston (2010) where agents
use multi-period forecasts upon making optimal decisions instead of making forecasts only a period
in advance as in the standard learning model of Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
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2.1 Households
There is a large number of households, each one consisting of a continuum of consumers that can



















The household gets utility from consumption Cht and disutility from the labor e¤ort L
h
t supplied























where P vt is the cost per vacancy posted and V
h
t the vacancies posted by the particular household.
The households can post vacancies. Whenever a vacancy is lled with a worker, the household
obtains the shares of the rm that is created by the successful match. The right hand side of
the budget constraint includes the period t income from various sources. The government pays
unemployment benet bht to the Ih  Nht unemployed workers in the household denoting as Ih the
measure of the household. The labor income comes from the Nht employed household members
providing Lht hours each and getting compensated w
h
t units of the real good per unit of e¤ort. The
transfers from the government are indicated by Tht . The household is entitled to dividend payment
dht from each of the ~N
h
t rms the household owns. The evolution of the households stock portfolio
is
~Nht+1 = (1  ) ~Nht + qtV ht
where the number of rms the household owns next period ~Nht+1, equals the surviving rms from last
period (1  ) ~Nht , since  is the exogenous destruction rate, along with the new rms created by the
hth household. The new matches are equal to the V ht vacancies posted by the household weighted
by the probability of a vacancy to match qt. The number of employed workers the household has
evolves according to





where t is the probability of an unemployed worker to leave the unemployment pool. The household
has no means of inuencing the number of employed workers it has since it cannot benet its own
workers as no control variables appear in the household employment constraint above.
2.1.1 The Household Problem
The state variable for the household is the number of its employed workers Nht and the number
of rms/jobs it owns ~Nht . Even though those two numbers are the same in equilibrium, at the
stage of the optimization problem the household knows that posting vacancies cannot boost the
employment level within its borders. That is because the household realizes that it is too small
compared to the whole economy and therefore the probability one of its own workers matches with
a vacancy the household opens is negligible. Moreover, households neglect the fact that all other
households are the same and thus cannot anticipate the identical and coordinated response of every








with E^ht the households expectation operator which may be di¤erent from rational. The household
problem then is characterized by the following Bellman equation, since agents are maximized present
discounted utility with discount factor . That is:
WH (
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the law of motion for jobs owned by the household,
~Nht+1 = (1  ) ~Nht + qtV ht (3)
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and the law of motion for the household employment level











where ht is the Lagrangian multiplier.











The envelope condition with respect to ~Nht is
WH~Nht
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Lead (7) one period forward and plug into (6). Then substitute (6) in after leading (6) a period in
























is the households stochastic discount factor. This expression is the job creation condition. The left
hand side of the job creation condition is the cost of a vacancy because P vt is the per unit of time
cost of a vacancy and 1qt is the vacancy duration which is the inverse of the probability a vacancy
nds a match qt.
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~Nht+s+1 is the opportunity cost for having ~N
h
t+s+1 jobs in period t + s + 1 since a




transversality condition states that the present discounted value of the cost to produce ~Nht+s+1 the
nal period should be zero.
2.1.2 The Bellman Equations
The household problem introduced right above can further give us the surplus of a job to the worker
and the surplus of a job to the rm by simply taking the appropriate envelope condition. I present
those expressions here which I am going to use in the next few sections where I present the wage
determination. The di¤erence between the value of a job to the employer and the value of a vacancy
to the employer2 is the envelope condition (7). However this condition is in utility units. Transform


















which is the surplus of a job to the employer expressed in terms of the
real good while using (9). The above envelope condition becomes
F Jt = d
h





The above equation states that the value of a job to the rm is the dividend plus the future value of




is the cost of a vacancy since the numerator is the cost of a vacancy per unit of time and 1=qt+s
the duration of a vacancy.
2The employers in this model are the households since vacancy posting can give the household new rm ownership.
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if the above is solved forward, then the value of the rm is the present discounted value of all future
cash ows for as long as the rm is expected to survive, which is exactly where our intuition guides
us.
The surplus of a job to the worker, which is the di¤erence between the value of a job and
the value of unemployment to the worker can be found in a similar fashion by taking an envelope
condition in the household problem with respect to Nht , which represents the marginal utility gain












  ht bht + (1    t) E^tWHNht+1 (
t+1)
Again I divide the expression above by the marginal utility to represent the above in real units and






which is the value of employment minus the value of unemployment
for the household. That means the surplus of a job to the worker in real units is











The surplus of a job to the household WEt  WUt , according to the above equation, is the total
wage wht L
h




benet lost from the transition to the unemployment pool bht , plus the surplus the household is





with associated probability t, the probability a worker nds a job. Equations (11) and (12) dene
the pieces of the total surplus from a match, useful ingredients for the determination of the wage
which I present in one of the sections to follow.
2.2 Firms
A job is a rm which employs a single worker. Therefore, there are Nt employed individuals in the
economy and therefore Nt rms. Each rm uses L
j
t units of the workers e¤ort as input to produce
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where At is an AR(1) productivity shock with autoregressive coe¢ cient A and steady state value
of one. That is
At = 1  A + AAt 1 + "t
and "t is a zero mean iid shock. The aggregate consumption good is a combination of all individual



































As we demonstrated in the previous section, a job creates a surplus for both workers and rms.
Since this surplus is what workers and rms are going to split, they have to make sure it is as large
as possible. The rms maximize the total surplus from a match by choosing every period the price
they charge for their good. This is optimal for the part of the rm because the rm knows the
bargaining stage will split the surplus in xed proportions to workers and rms. Knowing that, the
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rm can do nothing better than maximize that surplus. Even if the rm is getting a very small part
of the surplus, the best strategy is to maximize it picking the appropriate price. The total surplus






Use equations (11) and (12) to substitute the rms and workers surpluses in the above expression,
to relate the total surplus to the choice variable of the rm, its price pjt. In addition, use the fact
that the dividend is djt =
pjt
Pt
yjt  wjtLjt . After the pre-mentioned substitutions, maximizing the total


















is the marginal disutility from providing Lt labor units in terms of the real good.
The rm maximizes the surplus by treating 	t as xed. For further details on this result check
Appendix A.
The rst order condition implies the usual monopoly result that the price is a markup over the
real marginal cost. Ignore the j subscript since all rms are identical. The relative price of a single

































which determines output as a function of marginal utility and the state variables and summarizes
the pricing decisions of the rms.
2.2.1 Nash Bargaining
The rm and the worker bargain together to set the wage. The current match creates a surplus,
(16), that needs to be split to the two parties. A Nash bargaining regime suggests that the surplus
is split by transferring  part of the surplus to workers and 1  to rms. In other words, the above









The rst order condition implies
(1  )  WEt  WUt  = F Jt
where the individual surpluses are envelope conditions from the household problem, equations (11)



















The derivation of the wage is in the Appendix B. The wage at every period is positively related to
the disutility of devoting Lht hours of labor. Higher disutility of labor requires higher wage since the
extra e¤ort needs to be compensated. Higher unemployment benet bht grants bargaining power
to workers who can negotiate a higher wage. Either an increase in the cost of a vacancy P vt or
and increase in market tightness #t gives bargaining power to the worker who can eventually leave
the bargaining table with a higher wage. Higher market tightness means workers can nd a match
more easily relative to vacancies thus workers demand a higher wage in such a scenario.
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2.3 Household Problem Revisited
The rational expectations assumption is a very convenient tool since it imposes a lot of structure on
the solution of any model. In my model agents separate control variables from forecasting variables
and they provide forecasts for those same variables a rational agent does. Therefore, I force the
agents to form expectations of variables that rst of all are outside of their control3 . In order to nd
the appropriate forms of expectations the agents are facing I use the rst order conditions of the
agents without imposing any equilibrium conditions on them. For example the household doesnt
know that all other households are the same or that the other workers are receiving the same wages
or what the pricing formula of a rm is. In the formation of expectations agents know only about
themselves. Any future variables that are outside the agentscontrol need to be forecasted using
the state variables as regressors.
The solution to the household problem involves the combination of the job creation condition
(consumption and vacancies FOCs combined) which I repeat below
P vt
qt




























As I already mentioned in the household section, the variable Nht is the number of employed people
within the household while ~Nht the number of rms/jobs the household owns. In equilibrium ~N
h
t
and Nht are the same and equal to the economy-wide employment but households do not know that
simply because they ignore that every other household is identical to their own in every aspect.
The equation for the law of motion of ~Nht is
~Nht+1 = (1  ) ~Nht + qtV ht (22)
3 If on the contrary a variable to be forecasted is in the agents control, using least squares techniques would mean
that the agent is not behaving optimally.
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where qt is the probability a vacancy to match. The number of employed workers Nht the household
has, evolves according to





where t is the probability an unemployed worker to nd a job.
Since the government keeps a balanced budget and all households are identical, the transfers to
each household are going to be equal to the unemployment benet per household. The households
at this stage cannot possibly have this information. It doesnt understand that all other households
are identical in every aspect. However, I assume agents know bht and transfers T
h
t are the same for all
households and also equal in magnitude every period for simplicity. If I did not assume households
possess this knowledge about scal arrangements, the households would need to provide forecasts























2.3.1 The Intertemporal Budget Constraint
The households derive an optimal decision rule for consumption that is valid for arbitrary expec-
tations which requires to combine the Euler equation and the intertemporal budget constraint. It
is a version of permanent income theory in general equilibrium adjusted to a search and matching
framework. For the intertemporal budget constraint rst substitute in the ow budget constraint































where I dened Kt =
Pvt
qt
as the cost of vacancies per unit of time. The per unit cost P vt will be
held constant. Log linearize the budget constraint equation (25) to get
CC^ht + 











+ d Nd^ht +

d N + (1  ) K N n^ht
The intertemporal budget constraint should relate consumption which is a choice variable for the
household, to forecasts of variables outside of the households choice that can be either prices
determined by the market or aggregate variables. The wage is determined by the bargaining problem
between the household and the rms, hence it is not outside the households control. Log-linearize
the wage equation (20). The log-linearized wage equation is
w^ht + L^
h
























which apart from consumption it is comprised of variables outside the households control. The
wage involves variables such as the demand of the rm y^ht , the price the rm sets p^
hr
t and technology
A^t which are variables the household has no control over them. Appendix C goes over the details

















































t denotes rms revenue and the epsilon variables dened in Appendix C
contain structural parameters and steady state values.
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2.3.2 The Consumption Equation
The intertemporal budget constraint (26) is consisted of expectations of future variables outside of
the households control except for the rst term which is the weighted sum of all future consumption
levels of the household. I need to substitute away future consumption and the way to go is to use
the job creation condition. The asset pricing equation for the jobs which is nothing more than a









after assuming log utility for preferences. Appendix D presents the derivation of the consump-
tion equation which basically combines the log-linearized asset pricing equation for jobs, equation
(27) and the intertemporal budget constraint (26) to eliminate future consumption. The resulting
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2.4 Equilibrium and aggregate dynamics
All households are identical, having the same ratio of unemployed to employed workers and facing
the same constraints4 . Firms are also identical facing the same technology and decision problems
4However, the foreward looking variables that need to be forecasted arised from the fact that agents do not
understand that others behave identically.
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and bargain wages using the same Nash Bargain framework. Since all households are the same, the
h subscripts are dropped and after aggregating all consumption equations (28) for all households
in the economy and dene the average expectations as E^t =
Z
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v
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1 v   k + w v1 v(1  ) 1 
i
The above consumption equation is the only equation that involves forward looking variables
that need to be forecasted by agents. The only thing remaining is to present the framework
according to which agents form expectations which is the subject of the following section.
Furthermore, in equilibrium Nt = Nht = ~N
h
t since all households are the same. Therefore the
equilibrium employment law of motion becomes







is a constant returns to scale matching function. The above law of motion states that employment
next period is known a period in advance.
After imposing equilibrium conditions on the wage equation (20) and the fact that every worker
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and rm are the same, the wage becomes




















Substitute this into (31) and get
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 (1 + `)
Yt
Nt
  (1  ) bt   P vt #t
2.5 Expectations
According to (29) the households need to form multi-period forecasts of dividend, vacancy cost,
labor demand and the revenue of the rm. The households keep in mind that every variable at any
point in time is a function of the state variables and they use econometric techniques to reect this
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Moreover, as agents need to make multi-period forecasts, they also need to forecast the evolution








2 A^t 1 + "
n
t (36)
and the technology shock according to
A^t = AA^t 1 + "t (37)
I assume the law of motion of the technology shock is exogenous and completely known to the
agents for simplicity5 meaning that no estimate for A is necessary.
2.5.1 Timing
At the beginning of every period t, agents are equipped with estimates of the coe¢ cients that de-
termine beliefs using data from the previous period t 1. For example, in equation for consumption
(29) the agents need among other things to form expectations for future dividends dt+j . Thus, the












2;t 1 are belief parameters inherited from the previous period. Agents
tend to assume that the belief parameters above are going to remain xed for the periods to come
even though they will eventually alter each one of those in subsequent periods. The way to estimate
Etnt+j , is to iterate on equation (36) and EtA^t+T 1 by iterating on (37). Therefore, the agents











5 If alternatively I forced the agents to estimate the law of motion of the technology shock the regression coe¢ cients
would converge very fast to the true values especially because the technology process is exogenous and its realization
is not inuenced from past forecastng mistakes.
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2.5.2 Perpetual Learning
The next challenge for the agents is to estimate all those parameters  that correspond to the
regression coe¢ cients in the system above, equations (32) - (35). To achieve this goal the agents




































as the matrix of regression coe¢ cients. The agents need to estimate the matrix of coe¢ cients 
every period by using as regressors a constant, current and past employment realizations as well as
technology realizations6 . To specify the updating of the estimated parameters I dene the following







and the vector of the dependent variables
z0t =





The algorithm that recursively denes the estimated parameters is:










6 I include a constant in the estimation process even though the model has a steady state of zero since agents
being irrational they might believe the steady state might be changing.
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where g 2 (0; 1) is a constant gain parameter7 . Agents estimate t at the end of the period t after
making consumption and vacancy decisions. This means that the period t decisions are based on
the estimated parameters t 1.
The derivation of the actual law of motion (ALM) for consumption is presented in Appendix E.










































































The following log-linear equations dene the solution of the model along with the recursive rule for
updating beliefs, equations (38) and (39).














L^t = Y^t   (1 + ) n^t   A^t
The demand
r^ht = Y^t   n^t
7Higher g means the households weight current observations more heavily than the past ones. For example a gain
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The foc of the rms problem
[` (1 + ) + ] n^t + (1 + `) A^t = `Y^t + C^t
The technology process
A^t = AA^t 1 + "t











The cost of vacancies after assuming P vt is a constant
K^t = P^
v
t + #^t = #^t
The wage equation from bargaining
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Appendix F presents the model to be estimated in a form that can be easily simulated using any
software.
3 Simulation and results
I calibrate the model by setting the parameters to common values used in the search and matching
literature. I simulate the model in an attempt to match statistics from the US data from 1955:Q1
to 2007:Q4, for a total of 212 observations. I run the algorithm 3000 times. Each simulation
corresponds to 7000 + T periods. The rst 7000 periods are ignored just to guarantee convergence
of the estimated parameters to the model stationary distribution. Thus, the estimated moments
are obtained from the last T periods. I set T = 212, the number of observations in my data set.
The algorithm is initialized according to Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007). The following
sections present the calibration and the main results.
3.1 Calibration
Table 1 summarizes the benchmark calibration. The time discount factor  is set to 0:99, a con-
siderably common value compared to most macroeconomic models. The elasticity of substitution 
for the consumption good is set to 11 as in Boivin and Giannoni (2005) a value which corresponds
to 1.1 markup for the rms. The inverse of labor supply elasticity `, is set to 2. The elasticity of
the matching function with respect to unemployment is set to 0.4 which matches the elasticity of
0.4 estimated by Blanchard and Diamond (1989). According to Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
acceptable values should lie within the interval (0.5 - 0.7). The workers share of the surplus  is set
to 0.5 since it is the usual value assumed in the literature even though empirical work has no pre-
dictions for this parameter. Moreover I set unemployment benet equal to zero since I attempt to
create amplication without changing the benchmark calibration in Shimer (2005) by much. Hage-
dorn and Manovskii (2005) show that setting the unemployment benet to a high value, around
0.9 and the workers share of surplus  to a small value, around 0.01, enough amplication can be
created in the basic search and matching model. However Costain and Reiter (2007) argue that
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Par Name/Explanation Value Source
 time discount factor 0:99 common in macro models
 elasticity of subs nal goods 11 corresponds to 1.1 markup
 elast. matching function 0:4 as Blanchard and Diamond (1989)
 workers bargaining power 0:5 commonly used. No microevidence
` inverse of labor supply elast 2 1` 2 (0,0.5) Card (1994)
 love of variety (LOV) 0 no LOV
 s.s unemployment probability 0:6 matches un. duration of 1.67
 separation rate 0:04 match 0.06 steady state unempl. rate
b unemployment benet 0 match data with lowest un. benet
A technology parameter 0:9 common in RBC models
q steady state vacancy probability 0:7 den Haan et al (2000)
Table 1: This is a summary of the baseline calibration.
such a calibration makes the model too sensitive to unemployment benet variations, reducing the
quality of its predictions for policy analysis.
The steady state unemployment probability  is set to 0.6, as in Cole and Rogerson (1999), which
ends up matching the average unemployment duration of 1.67 observed in quarterly US data. The
steady state probability a vacancy to match q is set to 0.7 as in Cooley and Quadrini (1999) and
den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000). The separation rate  is set to 0.04. Commonly used values
lie in the interval of between 0.08-0.10. That particular value of  used in this paper is necessary
to lock the steady state unemployment rate to 0.06.
The rest that needs to be chosen is the number of periods the model is simulated before starting
to compute moments and the gain parameter g 2 (0; 1). The total number of periods I run the
model is 7212 periods. The gain parameter g is set to 0.0045, 0.005 and 0.006, since higher values
of the gain parameter imply greater deviations from the rational expectations equilibrium. A gain
parameter of zero replicates the rational expectations model. Common in the literature are values
from 0.007-0.05 as in Branch and Evans (2006), Orphanides and Williams (2005) and others.
3.2 Data
The moments I am after to match come from quarterly US data from 1955:Q1 to 2007:Q1 where
all series are HP ltered and those moments are summarized in table 2. All variables but the
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vacancies series on that same table come from data series of the St. Louis economic database.
Specically output is the log of quarterly real Gdp, unemployment rate the civilian unemployment
rate, vacancies is the log of Help-Want advertising and the wage the hourly earnings in the business
sector. I simulate the model to match second moments from quarterly US data. Table 2 presents
a few statistics from the US data which are basically the target moments. It is clear from the
table that the amplication task is very challenging. Vacancies are nearly nine times the volatility
of output, unemployment nearly seven times the volatility of output while tightness is as large
as seventeen times more volatile than output. Moreover, the correlation between vacancies and
unemployment around -0.9 implies a high slope for the Beveridge curve. All series are highly
autocorrelated, pointing out that all those variables are very persistent. The standard deviation
of the wage is a bit higher than half the standard deviation of output. The low volatility of the
wage compared to output has been an issue in the RBC literature as pointed out by Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992). As a matter of fact, in the search and matching literature the wage volatility
implied by the standard model is exaggerated even more.
3.3 Results
Consider the impulse responses to a unit technology shock presented in gure 1 (or gure 2). The
blue dashed lines correspond to the perpetual learning model with gain 0.005 (or 0.006 for gure
2) and each one is the median point-wise response function from 3000 simulations. The red solid
lines corresponds to the impulse responses from the rational expectations model. In the rational
expectations case, a rise in labor productivity increases the demand for labor hours on impact. In
the following periods changes in production are mostly met by changes in employment and that
is why labor hours become negative once employment starts increase the period after the shock.
The increase in the demand for hours increases both hours and the real wage. Since the shock
is persistent and agents fully rational, the increase in productivity creates a wealth e¤ect since
consumers forecast an increase in their future income. This wealth e¤ect increases consumption
on impact. The di¤erence between income and consumption is simply vacancies. What consumers
dont consume they use it to create jobs. The increased consumption shifts the labor supply curve
125
upwards and along with the shifted labor demand, the wage overshoots and the labor hours are
barely increased.
Learning changes the picture a bit as the blue dashed lines in gure 1 suggest. The increase
in labor productivity again raises labor demand and increases wages and hours on impact through
a substitution e¤ect. However, the di¤erence with rational expectations is that agents learn using
past data which dampens the wealth e¤ect. Since consumption is determined from expectations
of future income and agents learn using past data, on impact consumption does nor rise as much
as the rational expectations case. That is why the response of consumption in gure 1 is lower on
impact from the rational expectations response. The low response of consumption leads to higher
vacancy posting since whatever is not consumed it is invested in new rms. This explains the large
response of vacancies under learning on impact. The next period expectations about future income
are revised and agents perceive that the big increase in employment is going to persist forever as
well as the large wages enjoyed the previous period and thus the consumers increase consumption
above the rational expectations response. This implies that once output is realized on the second
period, vacancies are going to be too few, because the consumption increase crowds out investment.
In other words, the second period, optimism about future returns increases consumption too much
and diminishes vacancy posting. This story continues until the responses return to their long-run
values leaving the vacancies response uctuating around the rational expectations response.
Moreover, as Huang, Liu and Zha (2008) nd, this decrease in consumption on impact (lower
wealth e¤ect) is going to have a di¤erent impact compared to rational expectations case. In their
model, lower consumption means the labor supply is not going to shift upwards as much, leading
to lower wages and higher labor hours. In my model the decrease of the impact of the wealth e¤ect
increase hours compared to the rational expectations case, in line with the ndings of the authors
above. However, in my model wages are increased in the learning model besides the decrease of
the wealth e¤ect. The reason is because the wage structure is much di¤erent now than in the
standard RBC case. The dampening of the wealth e¤ect decreases the wage on the rst hand but
on the other hand the rise in vacancies increases market tightness too much which gives bargaining
power to workers that grants them a higher wage contract. Thus in my model, the decrease in
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consumption leads to a big increase in the wage due to the importance of outside opportunities in
the wage formation in the search and matching framework.
The tables from 3 to 6 present the same set of statistics as table 2 and are obtained from
simulating the model for di¤erent gain parameters. Table 3 corresponds to gain g=0 or the ra-
tional expectations model. Tables 4 to 6 represent the models with perpetual learning and each
table summarizes the statistics gathered by simulating the models with constant gains g=0.0045,
g=0.005 and g=0.0055 respectively. Let us focus on the amplication e¤ects of the models which
are isolated in table 7. Each row presents relative standard deviations of vacancies, unemployment
market tightness and the real wage with respect to output, from data and di¤erent model speci-
cations. The rst row of numbers corresponds to the statistics from US data. The second row is
the rational expectations models moments. Clearly the rational expectations model cannot gener-
ate any amplication for vacancies unemployment and market tightness. Although in this model
specication the wage volatility is a bit exaggerated, it is not as high as the models with perpetual
learning. From the third row to the end are the statistics obtained from the learning models. As
the gain parameter g increases the models amplication increases dramatically. When the constant
gain parameter g is set to 0.0055 the model can amplify the labor market variables as much as the
data suggests.
The extra amplication in the model with perpetual learning arises because agents make fore-
casts using a misspecied model. The agentsbeliefs stemming from the misspecied forecasting
model are assumed to last forever while in fact the agents are going to revise them the following
period. This behavior is what creates extra amplication in the model, boosting the volatilities of
vacancies and unemployment signicantly.
Although added volatility seems to be benecial for most of the labor market variables, I cannot
claim the same thing for the wage series. Wage in the data is a little more than half as volatile as
output. The rational expectations seems to be closer to the data than the rest of the models, even
though it attains a value that is more than double the one observed in the data. Learning does not
seem to resolve this issue but it was absolutely expected. Take a look again at the wage implied by
the search and matching model, equation (31). When vacancies increase and unemployment shrinks,
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market tightness becomes very large since tightness #t equals vacancies over unemployment Vt=Ut.
This means that boosting the volatilities of vacancies and unemployment immediately increases the
volatility of the real wage. This is due to the fact that outside opportunities tend to a¤ect the wage
in the search and matching literature due to Nash bargain. More vacancies than unemployed gives
bargaining power to workers because they can break the match at any time and nd a job elsewhere
very easily, while for the rm to nd another match is relatively more di¢ cult. Since tightness is
very volatile, the wage becomes too volatile and absorbs most of the e¤ect of the shock. However,
the increased volatility that appears in the learning model does not come from a change in the wage
formation. It comes from mistakes in the formation of forecasts about the future dividends of the
rms. Therefore, the wage is going to be more volatile than in the rational expectation models case,
since theres nothing to keep tightness from causing the wage to overshoot. Increasing the volatility
of the forecasts of future dividends boosts the volatility of vacancies and unemployment but also
that of the wage. In a more complex model with sticky wages for continuing rms, the volatility
of the wage could be signicantly reduced to the data levels. Moreover, such a modication would
not sacrice the amplication for the rest of the variables. On the contrary, it would even provide
some additional amplication on top.
Once persistence is examined the picture changes a lot. The responses in gure 1 suggest that
the responses from perpetual learning die out more slowly. However, observing the autocorrelations
of the variables in tables 3 to 6 which are summarized in table 8, one can infer that the rational
expectations model can outperform the learning model. When the gain parameter increases, the rst
order autocorrelation of vacancies becomes negative. The reason lies in the behavior of vacancies
which is the main reason for the distortion in autocorrelations. It is easier to visualize what is
going on if you take a look at gure 3 where I present the mean impulse response of vacancies
under rational expectations after a unit technology shock, along with the mean impulse responses
of vacancies from the learning model for di¤erent gain parameters. The red solid line corresponds to
the rational expectations case while the blue dashed line is the learning model with gain g=0.005,
the black dotted line is the learning model with gain g=0.0055 and the mixed line corresponds to
g=0.006. It is obvious that higher gain leads to higher volatility for vacancies by making vacancies
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uctuate around the rational expectations response. When vacancies one period is above average,
next period it appears below average and so on. This makes the degree of autocorrelation in
vacancies to drop as the gain parameter increases and when the gain is su¢ ciently large it even
becomes negative. The impulse response for vacancies in the learning model is high on impact
and the period following the shock and then goes below the response of the rational expectation
model and then on top again. It uctuates around the rational expectations response. This kind
of movement is what distorts all correlations in the model.
In this model output does not seem to be much a¤ected by expectations. I dont mean that
income is not a¤ected at all, but the e¤ect of learning on output is rather mild. The behavior of
the output response can be understood by examining the foc of the rm which I repeat below
`n^t + (1 + `) A^t = `Y^t + C^t
Set  = 0 which is the benchmark calibration and use the log-linear resource constraint
Y Y^t = CCt + P
v V V^t










The parameter YC ' 1 because Y = C+ V and V should be as small as possible not only to be able
to match US data facts, but also to be able to have any amplication in the model8 . The output
response is then equal to








The change in output equals the change in technology A^t plus a fraction of the change in employment
`
1+` n^t plus a fraction of the change in vacancies. Employment steady state is very high and thus
8Deviations of vacancies from the steady state are larger the smaller the vacancy steady state is. Assuming a high
value for Vacancy steady state value diminishes the models amplication potential.
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deviations from it are very small. Moreover, the steady state of vacancies is too small which makes
the term P v VC equal to 0.03. Even if V^t is as large as 3 times the response of output, output is barely
volatile. Learning can boost employment and vacancies but unemployment response cannot be too
high since its steady state is high and also the e¤ect of vacancies on output is small since vacancies
are a very small part of aggregate Gdp. Therefore, when expectations determine consumption,
output is barely a¤ected and vacancies are whatever part of the output is not consumed. The
ability of the learning to a¤ect output is crucial in order to replicate the results as in Eusepi and
Preston (2010).
To summarize, it is important to note that the greater amplication seems to come at the
cost of distorting correlations, but this is not solely due to the way beliefs are formed. It is also
a¤ected by the fact that the simple search and matching model I have used, implies output is not
much inuenced by expectations. By employing a di¤erent framework, the way vacancies uctuate
can be reduced enhancing the performance of the model against autocorrelations. However it is
important to note that the search and matching model needs a very high amplication boost to
match the data as can be seen by comparing the rst two rows of table 7. If this amplication is
solely provided by a perpetual learning framework, there is inevitably going to be some trade-o¤
between amplication and correlation. The model with gain g=0.0045 can amplify the vacancies
and unemployment processes by more than 50% compared to the rational expectations model.
However, the correlations remain more or less the same between the two models, denoting that
learning is not distorting the rest of the model implied moments. Nevertheless, the gap between
the volatilities in the data and the model with g=0.0045 is still signicant. The amplication that
is needed to eliminate the gap is around nine times the amplication in the rational expectations
model which forces me to employ higher values for the gain parameter creating a trade-o¤ between
success in providing amplication over correlation in the model.
The most important e¤ect of the distortion in the correlations implied by the model with per-
petual learning is the reduction in the correlation between vacancies and unemployment. Table
9 presents the correlations between vacancies and unemployment which denes the slope of the
Beveridge curve. The correlation of the two variables in the data is high and negative with a value
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of -0.91. The rational expectations model implies a correlation of -0.63 and it is not even close to
match the data. The models with higher gain imply an even lower correlation in absolute value
and a positive correlation in the last two model specications. Note that the correlations are low in
absolute value even though vacancies are procyclical and unemployment countercyclical. As gure
1 demonstrates, while new matches start producing a period after the match, on impact, vacancies
achieve their highest value while unemployment remains at zero. When unemployment increases
later on, vacancies are already fading away inducing a very low correlation between the two vari-
ables. For higher gains, vacancies become negative when unemployment is at its pick, inducing
even positive correlation for vacancies and unemployment. As the gain parameter increases this
correlation drops. Keep in mind that the amplication puzzle arises because in the wage equation
(31) the market tightness is too volatile making the wage too depended on outside opportunities.
The increased volatility in the wage decreases the volatility in dividends and leaves vacancies barely
a¤ected. Imagine a situation where vacancies and unemployment are highly positively correlated.
That would imply that market tightness #t would not be too volatile simply because vacancies and
unemployment cancel each other out. Such a model would support high volatilities for vacancies
and unemployment simply because the two variables cancel each other out and wages do not crowd
out vacancies. In the current models, vacancies and unemployment are not as highly negatively
correlated as the data suggest. This makes the amplication issue in the model a bit less severe
simply because market tightness is not as volatile as it should be if vacancies and unemployment
didnt partly o¤set each other. Therefore the models with high gain parameter provide some am-
plication for the wrong reason. Since tightness is less volatile than it would if the slope of the
Beveridge curve was around -0.9, wage becomes less volatile and its not as e¤ective in absorbing
most of the e¤ect of the shock.
3.4 Alternative Model Specication
The model I presented in this paper, besides the alternative expectations assumption, it di¤ers
from the standard search and matching model in two areas. First of all, in my model future cash
ows are discounted by a stochastic discount factor instead of a constant one. The addition of
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a stochastic discount factor can boost job creation a little bit. The reason is because agents are
risk averse and job/rm creation provides some insurance to the investor. After a productivity
shock income increases. Vacancies are posted on the current period where income is high and
they will make payments next period if a match is found, where income is lower. This means that
vacancy posting becomes a form of insurance and agents would keep posting vacancies even if the
dividend they are promised to pay next period is really small. However, when the discount factor
is constant, agents would stop posting vacancies when dividends are expected to be too low. Risk
neutral agents are only concerned about returns and not the state of the business cycle the cash
ows appear. Nonetheless, the amplication created by the inclusion of a stochastic discount factor
is not signicantly high. Nevertheless, assuming that agents are actually risk averse is a realistic
assumption.
Moreover, another di¤erence between my model and the standard case is that I assume there
is also labor e¤ort decision for the rm, while the standard search and matching model allows
changes in labor only through the extensive margin. I can replicate the results of a model with
just the extensive margin by setting the parameter dening disutility for labor ` to zero9 . Table
10 compares the benchmark learning model with a gain of 0.005 for di¤erent parameters for the
disutility of labor `. The model with no intensive margin (` = 0) can match the amplication
in the US data more easily while the one with ` = 2 (the benchmark model parameterization)
cannot. Since the disutility from labor in the model with no extensive margin is constant, the wage
is not as responsive and therefore it creates some extra prot margin for the rms compared to the
benchmark model, which results in an additional wave of vacancy postings. After a productivity
shock, on impact, labor hours/e¤ort increase. Agents expect next periods hours will be as high and
infer that the disutility of labor (the cost of labor) will be high for the periods to come. Therefore,
agents expect prots to be lower and end up posting less vacancies on impact. This channel is
















t is the number of workers the j
th rm
employes. Assume the disutility for labor in the utility function is Nht G (L) where the function G (L) is now constant.
Solving the model under this specication and solving my original model with ` = 0 is going to produce the same
dynamics.
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absent if the intensive margin is eliminated and the disutility of labor is constant. This observation
can be conrmed by comparing the last columns of table 10 where it shows that the volatility of
the wage in the models without the extensive margin is much lower than the benchmark model.
Decreasing the volatility of the wage signicantly is crucial for the search and matching model.
Despite the fact that the model with ` = 0 seems to outperform the benchmark model, the main
reason I keep the benchmark model as the one with both the intensive and extensive margin is
simply because it is more realistic10 .
3.5 The Distribution of Beliefs
The formation of beliefs is crucial for my result since the substitution or rational beliefs with
boundedly rational beliefs is what creates the additional amplication in this model. The way
beliefs are updated using perpetual learning through equations (38) and (39), suggests that as time
passes, beliefs will not converge to a particular value but to a distribution, since agents tend to
forget old data up to a certain threshold that is controlled by the gain parameter.
Figure 5 presents the densities of the belief coe¢ cients after simulating the model for a gain
of 0.005. The number of observations in each density are around 2,000,000 data points. Each
row corresponds to a variable that is forecasted and each column to the state variable used as a
regression for the formation of those forecasts. It is obvious that there is a very high dispersion for
each belief coe¢ cient. This is what actually creates the extra volatility in the learning model. This
dispersion endogenously creates shifts in agentsexpectation that becomes a source of business cycle
uctuations and probably the source that seems to be ignored in the standard search and matching
literature.
The medians of the densities for di¤erent gain parameters are reported in table 11 along with
the means. Although there is a very high scattering around the median, it seems to be very close
to the rational expectations case even though the mean states that the distributions are skewed.
Figure (4) shows the evolution of beliefs when instead of a constant gain I use a decreasing gain of
the form gt = 1=t. Each row of 3 graphs represent a coe¢ cient for a particular variable that needs
10Mind that in the standard search and matching model there is no intensive margin.
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to be forecasted by agents. Each row represents the coe¢ cient of the particular state variable. The
blue lines correspond to the beliefs while the red at line marks the rational expectations coe¢ cient.
All coe¢ cients eventually tend to converge to their rational expectations counterpart.
The impulse responses in gure (1) are di¤erent than the rational expectations responses on
impact which might suggest that the distribution of believes is not centered at the rational ex-
pectations belief coe¢ cients even though the conditions for E-Stability are satised and the gain
coe¢ cient is between zero and one. The reason is because of the non-linear dynamics the belief
system is following. Under decreasing gain, the coe¢ cients tend to converge to the rational ex-
pectations beliefs solely from the same side. For example, no matter how the belief framework is
initialized, the coe¢ cient of the state variable one for the dividend process, always converges from
above as can be seen in the second graph on the rst row of gure (4) . Therefore,as the constant
gain parameter increases, the belief parameters tend to converge to a distribution with means a bit
shifted from the rational expectations parameters.
4 Conclusion
In this study I consider a perpetual learning algorithm in an attempt to enhance the standard
search and matching models performance. The amplication problem of the standard search and
matching model is a very severe one and very e¤ective amplication mechanisms are needed for the
puzzle to be successfully resolved. Learning algorithms tend to have mild impact in the dynamics of
macroeconomic models as studies like Williams (2003) have shown. However, by assuming agents
rely on multi-period forecasts as in Eusepi and Preston (2010) rather than forecasts at most a
period in advance , the amplication prospective of the learning model is signicantly improved.
The learning model can provide amplication to match moments from the US data from 1955:Q1
to 2007:Q4. However, the extra amplication comes at the cost of distorted correlations since
the more amplication is added the more vacancies uctuate around the rational expectations
equilibrium achieving a low autocorrelation coe¢ cient that a¤ects the autocorrelation of every single
variable in the model. Moreover, learning distorts the correlation of vacancies and unemployment
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known as the Beveridge curve implying even a positive slope for the Beveridge curve as the gain
parameter increases.
The model could perform better in a more complex setup where there exists some mechanism
that could potentially keep vacancies in a smoother path. For example, endogenous job destruction
could open another channel for some corrections in employment to take place without violent shifts
in vacancies to be necessary. This is something that I tend to investigate in future research.
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A Appendix
In this section I introduce the surplus maximization for the rm that is choosing the appropriate
















The two objectives give the same answer given that the surplus is split according to (1  )  WEt  WUt  =
F Jt which implies that the surplus is split in xed portions to rms and workers.









Expand the expression in the brackets using the Bellman equations (11) and (12) in the above rst

























t   wht Lht and the above equation becomes
F Jt +W
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as independent of the price pht . This form has interesting implications because
it reveals that in a search and matching model, the cost of labor is the marginal rate of substitution,
the disutility of labor in real units. The standard New Keynesian model assumes that the rms
solve the exact same problem since the wage in that case equals the marginal rate of substitution,
which is assumed xed when rms maximize their prot.
B Appendix
This part of the appendix presents the wage determination. The wage in a search and matching
model splits the surplus to workers and rms in xed portions. The Nash bargain solution comes
from the following rst order condition
(1  )  WEt  WUt  = F Jt (40)
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which comes from the maximization of the surplus with respect to wage, equation (19). Plug in the
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First use (40) in the above expression to substitute WEt+1  WUt+1 away. After, use the vacancy






































d+ (1  ) KK^t + K d+ (1  ) K n^ht+1
=
W L




d+ (1  ) K Lht +  Y d+ (1  ) K N  p^hrt + y^ht + d d+ (1  ) K d^ht + n^ht
where n^ht are the rms owned by the h
th household, N^ht the number of the households employed
workers and N^t the aggregate employment level and evolve according to the laws of motion (which
139
need to be linearized rst) (22), (23) respectively. The household controls the number of rms to
own n^ht by posting vacancies as (22) shows. However, it has no control on the evolution of its own
employment level N^ht or the aggregate employment N^t because rst of all it is way too small to
a¤ect aggregate variables and also does not understand that the rest of the households are actually




1  N 1 1+` ( N (1+) Y )
1+` C
i
[ d N+(1 ) K N] , k =
 K  1  Pv #
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K
[ d+(1 ) K] , w =
W L
[ d+(1 ) K] ,
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[ d+(1 ) K] N , d =
d
[ d+(1 ) K] and also dene the revenue of the





The log linear budget constraint is













Moving it a period in advance
cC^t+1 + kK^t+1 + vn^
h
t+2   wN^ht+1   LLht+1   y r^ht+1   dd^ht+1 = n^ht+1
cC^
h
t+1 + kK^t+1 + vn^
h
t+2   wN^ht+1   y y^ht+1 + AA^t+1   pp^rt+1   dd^ht+1 = n^ht+1
and substitute it back into (41)
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j n^ht+j+1 = 0
Substitute in v =
K
[ d+(1 ) K] the fact that in the steady state
K = 1 (1 )








j n^ht+j+1 = 0 from the transversality condition. After taking



















































(1  ) KK^t+1 + dd^ht+1
i
    (1  ) K + d E^ht C^ht+1   C^ht 
Keep in mind that at the steady state
K =

1   (1  )
d
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which makes the log linearized asset pricing equation




The asset pricing equation at period t+ j   1 is





Use the same condition a period back
E^ht C^
h
t+j 1 =  (1  ) E^ht K^t+j 1   E^ht K^t+j 2 + (1   (1  )) E^ht dht+j 1 + E^ht C^ht+j 2
and substitute it in the initial one, equation (42)
E^ht C^
h
t+j =  (1  )
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Keep eliminating C^ht+j up to the t

















Substitute the Euler equation (43) to the intertemporal budget constraint (26)













































































Isolate in the above expression the terms that need to be forecasted and the ones that are already





















































































The household knows that the law of motion of the households employment level N^ht is:
N^ht+1 = (1    ) N^ht + ^t
The same law of motion at period j is:
N^ht+j = (1    ) N^ht+j 1 + ^t+j 1
Solving it backwards up to period t
N^ht+j = (1    )j N^ht + 
j 1X
s=0
(1    )s ^t+j s 1
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Now consider the expectation at period t of the law of motion for employment (36) in the t+ j +1
























Take equations (32) (33), and (34) respectively from period t+j+1 and solve backwards till period
t and substitute in equation (44) and equation (37) each solved backwards from period t+ j+1 till





































































































































































Use the above forecasts and the facts below in the consumption equation (29). The actual law of


















































































The following linear system can be simulated to produce predictions for consumption, output,
dividends, total wage, vacancy cost, rm demand, rm price, and employment after a shock to the
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technology "t.













the above can give simulations for the model. The parameters in the above expression
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The  parameters are the ones estimated by the households and should be updated according to
the recursive algorithm using

















































d^t K^t L^t r^t n^t+1

Just this part of the appendix and table 1 that summarizes the calibration is enough to replicate
the results of this paper.
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US data Stat Gdp Vac Un tight wage
St. dev relative to output x=Y 1 9:1 7:4 16:1 0:6
Quarterly autocorrelation t;t 1 0:84 0:9 0:89 0:9 0:73
Correlation matrix Gdp 1 0:87  0:85 0:88 0:25
Vac   1  0:91 0:98 0:17
Un     1  0:97  0:16
tight       1 0:17
wage         1
Table 2: Summary statistics from quarterly U.S Data 1955Q1:2007Q1. All variables are log devia-
tions from an HP trend with smoothing parameter 1600
REE g = 0 Stat Gdp Vac Un tight wage
St. dev relative to output x=Y 1 0:68 0:66 1:2 1:05
Quarterly autocorrelation t;t 1 0:91 0:68 0:95 0:92 0:91
Correlation matrix Gdp 1 0:91  0:89 0:99 1
Vac   1  0:63 0:91 0:92
Un     1  0:90  0:89
tight       1 0:99
wage         1
Table 3: Those are the moments implied by the rational expectations model. The standard devia-
tions in the top row are reported relative to the standard deviation of output
Learning g = 0:0045 Stat Gdp Vac Un tight wage
St. dev relative to output x=Y 1 1:97 1:27 2:6 1:44
Quarterly autocorrelation t;t 1 0:9 0:64 0:95 0:9 0:9
Correlation matrix Gdp 1 0:81  0:83 0:92 0:93
Vac   1  0:49 0:9 0:9
Un     1  0:79  0:79
tight       1 0:99
wage         1
Table 4: Those are the moments implied by the learning model with constant gain parameter
g=0.0045. The standard deviations in the top row are reported relative to the standard deviation
of output
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Learning g = 0:005 Stat Gdp Vac Un tight wage
St. dev relative to output x=Y 1 8:35 4:77 9:93 3:58
Quarterly autocorrelation t;t 1 0:9 0:1 0:59 0:28 0:39
Correlation matrix Gdp 1 0:49  0:62 0:68 0:74
Vac   1  0:01 0:91 0:9
Un     1  0:37  0:37
tight       1 0:99
wage         1
Table 5: Those are the moments implied by the learning model with constant gain parameter
g=0.005. The standard deviations in the top row are reported relative to the standard deviation of
output
Learning g = 0:0055 Stat Gdp Vac Un tight wage
St. dev relative to output x=Y 1 18:9 10:3 21:8 7:1
Quarterly autocorrelation t;t 1 0:68  0:05 0:34 0:15 0:17
Correlation matrix Gdp 1 0:39  0:57 0:63 0:66
Vac   1 0:27 0:92 0:92
Un     1  0:11  0:1
tight       1 0:99
wage         1
Table 6: Those are the moments implied by the learning model with constant gain parameter
g=0.0055. The standard deviations in the top row are reported relative to the standard deviation
of output
Vac Un tight wage
St. dev relative to output V =Y U=Y #=Y W =Y
US data 9:1 7:4 16:1 0:6
REE 0:68 0:66 1:2 1:05
g = 0:0045 1:97 1:27 2:6 1:44
g = 0:005 8:35 4:77 9:93 3:58
g = 0:0055 18:9 10:3 21:8 7:1
Table 7: The table presents the amplication results of the models with di¤erent gain parameters
along with the data. All moments are computed relative to output
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Gdp Vac Un tight wage
First order autocorrelations Yt;Yt 1 Vt;Vt 1 Ut;Ut 1 #t;#t 1 wt;wt 1
US data 0:84 0:9 0:89 0:9 0:73
REE 0:91 0:68 0:95 0:92 0:91
g = 0:0045 0:9 0:64 0:95 0:9 0:9
g = 0:005 0:9 0:1 0:59 0:28 0:39
g = 0:0055 0:68  0:05 0:34 0:15 0:17
Table 8: The table presents the rst order autocorrelations of the variables under di¤erent speci-
cations of the model along with the same moments from the US data
US data corr(V,U)
St. dev relative to output v;u
US data  0:91
REE  0:63
g = 0:0045  0:49
g = 0:005  0:1
g = 0:0055 0:27
Table 9: This is a summary of the implied correlations of vacancies and unemployment in the data
and in the models with di¤erent gain parameters
Vac Un tight wage
St. dev relative to output V =Y U=Y #=Y W =Y
US data 9:1 7:4 16:1 0:6
REE 0:68 0:66 1:2 1:05
g = 0:005, ` = 2 8:35 4:77 9:93 3:58
g = 0:005, ` = 0 23:4 13:1 27:5 1:53
Table 10: The table presents the amplication results of the models with di¤erent gain parameters
along with the data. All moments are computed relative to output
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Figure 1: Those are impulse responses after a unit technology shock. The red solid line represents the ra-
tional expectations equilibrium responses while the blue dashed lines the impulse responses under perpetual
learning. The gain parameter g is set to 0.0055
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Figure 2: Those are impulse responses after a unit technology shock. The red solid line represents the ra-
tional expectations equilibrium responses while the blue dashed lines the impulse responses under perpetual
learning. The gain parameter g is set to 0.006
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Figure 3: Responses of vacancies after a unit productivity shock. The solid red line is the responce in the
rational expectations model, the blue dashed line is the model with learning and constant gain parameter
0.005. The black dotted responce corresponds to the learning model with gain parameter 0.0055 and the
green dashed and dotted line to gain 0.006
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Coe¢ cient mean median RE
g=0.005 g=0.005
d0 0 0 0
k0 0 0 0
L0 0 0 0
r0 0 0 0
n0 0 0 0
d1  37:9  10:02  13:74
k1 2:2 0:69 0:64
L1  0:48  0:53  0:53
r1  0:48  0:44  0:52
n1 0:47 0:38 0:37
d2 2:24  0:11  0:01
k2 0:27 0:40 0:41
L2  0:003 0:002 0:002
r2 0:89 0:88 0:9
n2 0:02 0:02 0:03
Table 11: Those are the means and medians of the distributions of the belief coe¢ cients induced
by perpetual learning along with the rational expectations coe¢ cients.
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